Ukraine War
Ukraine: Distributed Denial of Defence (DDOD)
Some whimsical thoughts about the anticipated Ukraine counter-offensive and Russia’s WWII obsession
I was just reading a story here on Medium about the use of kayaks by Ukraine special forces. It triggered an idea that had been gestating in my brain for a few days, and linked to that well known ethos of Muhammad Ali:
Float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.
Russia has invested a huge amount of resources and manpower in building reinforced defensive lines in depth. And manning them, ready to repel the expected offensive by Ukrainian forces. Head on, wherever the point of contact, Russia is ready. Maybe. They supposedly have 140,000-200,000 (depending on source) mostly conscripted grunts there. But well dug in.
I read that Moscow was empty of construction equipment, concrete mixers and trucks, that they had been sent to construct the defences of Lukhansk and Donestsk. Maybe, maybe not, but there is little doubt that robust and extensive defensive lines have been built. Ukraine’s own Intelligence people have said as much.
Do the Russian planners really believe that Ukraine’s commanders would throw away lives attacking such defences? The Russians are stuck with an out-of-date mentality. They think that lives are plentiful and cheap.
DDOD
Avoiding pitched battles is definitely out of the asymmetric playbook. It’s costly, wasteful and will not achieve the objectives. The Viet Cong were masters of asymmetric warfare and only held pitched battles when they were backup up by NVA troops in number.
My thinking here today is that Ukraine simply denies Russia the chance to use its wide and deep defence network which I’m calling distributed denial of defence.
I obviously half-borrowed it from IT — DDOS attacks, distributed denial of service.
Despite Ukraine’s growing number of fresh tank brigades with vastly superior tank quality (numerical superiority is questionable), I don’t think we will see large scale tank battles. Assaults will be localised and rapid, like quick jabs, until a weak spot is found when the enemy is turned.
Dylan Combellick took a look at Russian defence strength:
The front line makes a little more sense geographically speaking, at least. Ukraine does in fact have an army, and it will probably attack at some point along this 950km long line. The problems here are … many. First, Russia reportedly has around 140,000 troops in Ukraine right now, along the front line. This isn’t very many, considering how many they have supposedly drafted, which makes me wonder if Ukraine’s count might be a little low, but anyway. 140,000 troops for 950km of trenches. That’s about 150 soldiers per kilometer of trench, or about one soldier every 7 meters. This is nowhere near enough for many reasons.
And Jordan Kovacsik wrote about probing, using well-trained troops with modern armour in close support.
These UAF attacks are more than likely probing missions. We see drones take point and scout out positions, followed closely by UAF tanks and, subsequently, infantry. However, if the probing mission manages to break through, then all the better, but Ukraine, at this point, still looks disciplined and is reserved.
It’s also clear many of the UAF troops trained by the British and NATO have made it to the front. The British, especially, have always seen the tank as an infantry support weapon. This is why we see such a tight relationship between the UAF armour and infantry. In many of these videos, the UAF infantry is a harrowing 5 metres from their own armour as it runs over Russian positions; all the while, the tanks are belching fire from their multiple guns. — Jordan Kovacsik on Medium
Death by a thousand cuts, float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.
Psy-ops
From what I’ve read, Ukraine has done a very good job of reducing the morale of the Russian AF, helped along by Russia’s own efforts with poor leadership, lack of training, weapons and ammunition rationing (or so we are led to believe).
Most Russian conscripts know that being sent to the front is tantamount to a death sentence.
The Ukrainian use of drones to attack individual soldiers may not appear to make much sense logistically, but when you see video of what appear to be Russian soldiers surrendering to drones then you get a picture of what their mental state or level of commitment to the great cause might be.
Mentally, they have been well softened up. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rants have helped too.
But we should not underestimate Russia.
Maskirovka
What we do know is that half of what we see and hear from Ukraine is deliberately misleading. Probably all of what we hear from Russia is misleading.
We could expect multiple bombardments and feints, as well as other distractions from the real intent which might in itself be distributed.
But there may be a few clues.
If you face an obstacle, there are six things you can do:
- Go left around it (outflank)
- Go right around it (outflank)
- Go under it (tunnel)
- Go over it (paratroops, hang-gliders, jetpacks, helos, and so on)
- Demolish or dissolve it (but pre-attack bombardment attracts an immediate defence focus — at least of thought)
- Ignore it
You can of course pretend the obstacle isn’t there, but that doesn’t usually work unless you drug-up your troops to the eyeballs, and fail miserably. Like Russian commanders have done.
But when it comes to a Ukraine counter-offensive I’m thinking that #6 is a possibility, but maybe I’m being totally unrealistic.
How could Ukraine possibly achieve that? Obviously by not engaging directly in massive force with any specific aim of a particular breakthrough.
DDOD.
Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee. Until…
As happened in Bakhmut when the Russian 72nd Separate Motor-rifle Brigade abandoned its positions on the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut and exposed one flank of Prigozhin’s Wagner troops. A weak spot will develop and spread rapidly given the supposed state of the Russian forces.
With effective armour and highly mobile forces, the Ukraine field commanders could rapidly exploit that weak spot. But will it be in the east or the south?
I’m back to Muhammad Ali and another quote:
Rope a dope
And I’m wondering how that might apply to Ukraine? I’m talking about reversing the rope-a-dope.
The Russians as tied to their defence-in-depth Maginot line. A fixed rope.
El Pais recently published an excellent analysis of the Russian defensive lines, comparing them to the German Siegfried Line. The story is richly illustrated with annotated satellite photos of key Russian defences.
Here’s a choice quote from that El Pais story (my bolding):
The defensive obstacles being thrown up by Russia are similar to those deployed 80 years ago, says Helin [Swedish analyst], although easier to overcome. As an example, the dragon’s teeth being deployed are not dug into the ground as they were during WWII but placed on the surface and can be easily removed with an excavator. The bunkers constructed are also similarly designed, with no subterranean foundations or fortified walls: they are prefabricated and have been placed mainly along roads to provide cover for snipers.
However, the Russian defensive line remains “formidable,” as noted on April 12 by U.K. intelligence, above all on the Zaporizhzhia front,
What will happen?
Russian forces are mentally and physically tied to those concrete defensive lines. They are on the ropes, figuratively speaking. Yes they have fall-back routes and positions, and withdrawal plans (something that Gerasimov has ensured are in place as he has to plan for ‘strategic repositioning’ of his forces).
The Russian armed forces are waiting for a big thrust.
That’s where DDOD comes in. Deny Russia their defence in depth. Feint yes, confuse them, yes. Probe, yes.
Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee until the bee stings are overwhelming the immune system, the thousand cuts are bleeding the body to death.
Key objective
My belief is that Ukraine’s key objective is to break the land corridor to Crimea and break the Kerch Bridge with missiles.
The bulk of the current talk is about Bakhmut, Donetsk and Donbass. That’s the clue. It’s not about Crimea.
It seems to me that Russia cannot defend the land corridor west of Mariupol from the sea, because their navy is too vulnerable and stays close to their (now main) base in Novorossysk or well out in the Black Sea. Russia’s Kalibr missile stocks are patently running down (they are currently being heavily used with nine attacks on Kyiv in May so far); conventional naval bombardment would put their ships in range of Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. And after the Moskva sinking the world knows that those Neptune anti-ship missiles do work. And the US and UK have added Ukraine’s arsenal of anti-ship missiles.
With a force focus north of Mariupol, Ukraine could keep the psychological pressure on the eastern front and pivot south. Arguably, Russia is mentally locked behind its defensive lines.
However, Mariuopol is relatively closer to the Russian border than, say, Melitopol. Less time for air-defence intercepts.
Crimea
Crimea is what started all of this way back, it is Putin’s prized possession, the jewel in his Tsar’s crown. Therefore the isolation of Crimea would hit him hard and provide Ukraine with the most powerful leverage.
Which is why, of course, that some EU members have been quietly suggesting that Ukraine should cede Crimea, else Putin will go nuclear.
I’m wondering what was wrong with the Guantanamo solution? The USA leases Guantanamo from Cuba and despite coming close to nuclear war with the USSR in 1962, the lease survived. Just lease Sevastopol to Russia for 99 years. But make the rental cost— well, think of a demand. It might have been an option pre-2022, but is totally unrealistic now.
Conclusion
I’m sorry, there is no substantive conclusion, just a couple of quotes, a (new?) acronym, and a form of torture.
- DDOD
- Rope a dope
- Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee
- Death by a thousand cuts.
Take your pick. Mix’n match as they say.
But I do like the phrase ‘distributed denial of defence’, DDOD. And I wonder if that really is a credible concept.
As I said at the outset, these are whimsical thoughts from an armchair amateur with no military experience or connections, so my musings are just that - uninformed, untaught speculations and no security threat to Ukraine forces.
But at least I do have a right to think and express my thoughts, unlike millions of Russian citizens.
Latest:
The BBC has analysed the latest Maxar satellite images showing a wide range of fixed defences.
It shows that Russia is preparing to defend areas of open ground (without natural protection from hills and rivers) alongside their wider trench network.
But some analysts note that Ukrainian forces can use similar satellite images and drone surveillance to identify and bypass many of these defences.
Alexander Lord from strategic advisory firm Sibylline Ltd says: “The Russians will therefore likely attempt to funnel Ukrainian forces down certain routes which are heavily mined and pre-targeted by Russian artillery.”
Satellite images show obvious defences — but that might all be part of Russia’s plan. — BBC
Russia is obsessed with fixed positions.
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