The Power of Disinterested Pleasure

A discussion of Kant’s concept of pure, pre-rational aesthetic pleasure

German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724– 1804) discusses in his Critic of the Power of Judgement a concept he calls “disinterested pleasure.” According to Kant, beautiful objects are purposive without purpose. This means that whereas we usually think of an object’s purpose as whatever it was designed or manufactured to do, the element of beauty or aesthetic pleasure is also purposive, but without a definite purpose.

The beautiful is neither connected to functionality nor to perfection nor to judgments on whether the object is good at fulfilling the need it was meant to fulfill or not. Aesthetic judgments are disinterested, argues Kant. As such, they result in pleasure, or their sole purpose is pure pleasure. What makes a judgment aesthetic is in fact that it is based on a feeling of pleasure, which according to Kant indicates that it is non-cognitive, non-rational — or perhaps pre-rational.

This notion is very much in correlation to my previous discussion on intuition and intuitive decisions. When able to tune into one’s intuitive compass one can access pre-rational insights to make decisions that aren’t influenced by cultural should-do’s and societal assumptions; these are anti-trendy decisions.

The disinterested pleasure connected to aesthetic judgments is, according to Kant, an edifying experience, since it allows for the imagination to play freely. When faced with beauty, we are momentarily liberated from the limitations that characterize rational thoughts—processes of deduction, induction, etc.—and allowed to experience an uncontrolled flow of emotions and thoughts.

The disinterest that Kant connects to the aesthetic judgment is linked to the my concept of anti-trend; anti-trendy judgments are precisely characterized by being disinterested or unrestrained by the need to be aligned with societal or cultural judgments of taste. Kant debates that the aesthetic judgments should be concerned only with form—shapes, harmony, symmetry/asymmetry, rhythm, etc.—rather than with the sensible content, such as color and tones, since these qualities are connected to the subjectively agreeable, and thereby of interest. Despite the complex notion on relating disinterest to form and desire to color and tones, the differentiation between form and sensible content is essentially to be understood as a differentiation between universality and subjectivity.

The sensible content that Kant separates from the disinterested pleasure of the aesthetic judgment could resemble the trend-based, fleeting cultural consensus on whatever is considered “good taste” and with the individual’s interest in being acknowledged as someone, who knows what to buy and what to wear in order to fit into the fleeting cultural consensus on consumerist preferences.

Taste is essentially subjective, as it is connected to subjective liking or disliking, nothing else. Individual tastes are typically based on either personal experience, external influences by authorities, or cultural truisms and consensus of “right and wrong”; this makes them inconsistent and alterable. Subjective outbursts of — and defense for — taste can only occur in the realm of a society, states Kant. The approving gaze from peers is required.

However, when tied up to validation from others, the experience of beauty becomes interested rather than disinterested. The aesthetic experience is deprived of its edifying “free play” element. Subjective taste could more accurately be called judgments of agreeableness rather than of beauty; they indicate personal preferences and are typically based on the desire to receive affirmation.

Consequently, in order for the aesthetic experience to be disinterested, it must be linked to an a priori principle for taste; to pure pleasure detached from desire or interests, according to Kant.

This notion relates to a previously quoted Simone de Beauvoir passage:

“If a man prefers the land he has discovered to the possession of this land, a painting or a statue to their material presence, it is insofar as they appear to him as possibilities open to other men”.

This de Beauvoir quote expressively defines the difference between interest and disinterest — as well as underlines the disinterested character of the pure aesthetic experience. The disinterested experience of beauty requires no ownership — it is open and sharable. It indicates what Kant calls a sensus communis, a common sense; not as in the common meaning of the term — i.e., a basic level of practical knowledge — but rather, a sense common to all, which implies universal validity.

However, the aesthetic judgment is only universally applicable when disinterested, and only if it is subtracted from subjective and societal desire and appeal, or from the fleeting consensus on attractiveness. The a priori, presumptive principle is founded on the fact that aesthetic judgments can be shared and communicated to others.

Kant’s notion on the universality of aesthetic judgments, or “beauty-experiences,” resonates deeply with my theory on aesthetic nourishment, which in my definition of the term is to be understood as a universally human capability based on disinterest as well as pure pleasure.

When aesthetically nourished we are momentarily freed from desires and interests; we are filled up on a nearly spiritual level. The edifying, aesthetically nourishing experience is accessible to us all. The capability to open up to beauty-experiences is inherent in all human beings, and it can be nurtured and cultivated.

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