The Elites in Moscow are Bringing Russia Closer to Political Collapse. Can They Survive?

In classical chess, the situation in which Russian President Vladimir Putin currently finds himself is called a zugzwang. Each new move of the player only worsens their position. Putting the opponent in zugzwang is a common way to help the superior side win a game, and in some cases, it is necessary in order to make the final win possible. But what if we don’t have a superior side?

Putin cannot afford to lose the war in Ukraine; military defeat would mean a loss of power for him. But he cannot win this war either, because he has no resources. Even the partial mobilization announced on September 21 is unlikely to change the balance on the frontline. Putin is stuck in Ukraine and cannot get out. He is already asking for negotiations. It is time, in his opinion, to fix the status quo. So far, there is no evidence that he will succeed. What are the prospects for Putin’s elites amidst the approaching political collapse?

It should not be forgotten that the collapse of the political system in Russia has already brought Vladimir Putin to the pinnacle of power twice. The first time was in 1991, after the collapse of the USSR. At that time, Putin, a former KGB officer, took an important position in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg. He became a deputy to Anatoly Sobchak, who was then mayor of the city. The second time was in 1996, when Putin moved to Moscow after the collapse of the administration of his boss, Anatoly Sobchak, who lost the election. Then Putin started working in the administration of President Boris Yeltsin and was later appointed director of the FSB (Federal Security Service). Along with Putin, his closest associates, who later held important positions in the Russian political system, moved to Moscow from St. Petersburg: Igor Sechin, Sergey Ivanov, Sergey Chemezov, and others. Will the Russian leader and his inner circle be able to perform the same political maneuver a third time?

The legitimacy of Putin’s regime has never been based on its popularity or the electoral preferences of Russians. In a country where free elections have not been held for 25 years, such insignificant things as the opinion of citizens are usually not decisive.

Putin’s legitimacy has always been based on the loyalty of the elites. The loyalty of the elites is a key feature of Putin’s Russia during his long 22 years in power. During this time, a special system of Putin’s monetocracy (a form of government in which the political and sociological driving force is material wealth) has developed. Monetocracy has been the force that has bought this loyalty. It has proven to be the easiest, fastest and most reliable method of retaining political power in post-Soviet Russia.

Why invest in an election campaign on the eve of the presidential election if the loyal governors will already ensure the desired result in their regions? Why participate in political debates? It may seem unbelievable, but in 22 years, Putin has never participated in any campaign debates, and he has never personally conducted his own election campaign.

Let me remind the reader that in the last presidential election in 2018, Vladimir Putin received 91.44% of the vote in Chechnya (99.76% in 2012). At the same time, the Chechen Republic is financed almost entirely from the federal budget, and its leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, is one of the most influential figures in Putin’s entourage. This is what political loyalty means today. The power of money in this case ensures the loyalty of the Chechen people and its elite, and also the necessary results in the elections. An ordinary voter never protests against this order of things. According to the opinion prevalent in Russia, a person who has been unable to adapt himself and take a comfortable place in the vertical of power in the state is generally a “loser”.

Putin’s autocracy is built on the delegation of authority and political power to loyal actors. This delegation takes place within the super-centralized Russian bureaucratic system. The entire Russian state machine is built on loyalty. The professional qualities of officials do not matter, what matters are personal informal connections, nepotism, corruption and loyalty. It is necessary to comply with the rules of the game, otherwise the official is recognized as a dangerous freethinker and falls out of the system. The escape of Anatoly Chubais (one of the patriarchs of Russian politics who brought Putin to the Kremlin 25 years ago) confirms this thesis.

In this sense, the Russian elites, even at the highest level, are largely consolidated and do not express a desire to become independent actors. For this reason, politicians like Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kirienko, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and others, will never become Putin’s successors. They are obedient doers, masters of bureaucratic intrigue and talented corruptors, nothing more. They are constantly present in the information space and recognizable among voters, but their chances are zero.

The reason, as we see it, is not their lack of charisma, but the systemic institutional constraints under which all these political figures have to realize their ambitions. A quarter of a century of negative selection in Russian bureaucratic circles has not been in vain.

Throughout Putin’s presidency, elites at the highest level have gradually been replaced by the bureaucracy. And the bureaucracy is usually represented by obedient executives.

The professional ethics of Russian officials requires them to vacate their positions at the first signal from above (as Dmitry Medvedev did in 2012) and does not allow them to make independent decisions.

This is why this system does not recognize the existence of independent public institutions, such as free mass media, fair elections, and independent local government.

With Putin out of politics, the Russian elite will immediately recognise a new master of the Kremlin to lead the country and move fully under his banner. Historical experience suggests that this leader will not be a representative of the Russian bureaucracy, even from its top ranks. It could be relatively independent politicians like Evgeny Prigozhin or Ramzan Kadyrov, or some as yet unknown figures about whom we know nothing. On the other hand, it may not be necessary to replace the former master. Even in the absence of a leader, the elite may try to “mummify” Putin and appropriate his legacy (as it happened after Vladimir Lenin’s death in 1924) and quietly rule Russia in his name. As a result, the top bureaucracy will survive and perhaps even strengthen its position.

Without structural, institutional political change in Russia, this scenario appears to be one of the worst and at the same time the most likely. The future of Russia will be in the hands of the Russian people only if the system of loyalty is replaced by a system of real political representation.

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