Moral Relativists Are Justified to Make Moral Demands Too

No one should tell them that they can’t judge other people’s actions.

One of the most common criticisms moral absolutists (usually Christians) raise against moral relativists is that the latter holds no objective basis for their moral standard, thus they could not judge other people’s actions to be right or wrong.

Such criticism is not only false but also betrays their lack of self-awareness. In this short essay, I argue that it is legitimate for moral relativists to expect others to follow relative moral standards.

Moral Relativism Defined

“Moral relativism” is an umbrella term for a few concepts. The most commonly used one is meta-ethical moral relativism. Here is a definition given in Wikipedia:

Meta-ethical moral relativists believe not only that people disagree about moral issues, but that terms such as “good”, “bad”, “right” and “wrong” do not stand subject to universal truth conditions at all; rather, they are relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of an individual or a group of people.

This concept is different from descriptive moral relativism (a description of the fact that people have relative moral standards in the real world) and normative moral relativism (which proposes that people ought to tolerate other people practicing different moral values). For convenience, in this article, when I say “moral relativism”, I mean “meta-ethical moral relativism”.

Moral relativists can judge other people’s actions to be right or wrong

Even people who self-identify as moral absolutists judge other people based on obviously subjective moral standards. For example, failing to mow one’s own lawn is clearly not objectively wrong. In many countries, there are no laws dictating that homeowners must mow their lawns periodically. If weeds overgrow, that’s their own business. But in many Western countries, such a rule is written in the law, so people feel they are entitled to criticize their lazy neighbor who never mows their lawn. If you tell them, “You should not criticize your neighbor. After all, mowing lawns or not does not concern moral absolutes,” they might look at you like you are crazy.

No one thinks they could judge other people ONLY on issues concerning moral absolutes.

In fact, hardly any dispute, whether between spouses or nations, has to do with what may be construed as moral absolutes. Is there an objective moral standard on the scope of COVID-19 lockdown that should have been employed? Probably not. But this did not stop millions from accusing their governments of being too strict or too lenient.

There are different reasons for people to be moral absolutists, but I find (conservative) Christians to be more vocal in claiming that moral relativists should not judge other people. But guess what? Those same Christians somehow still think they are warranted to accuse other people of wrongdoing when the issue is not strictly black and white.

For example, when Christians see someone speeding, say, going at 50 km/hr on a road where the speed limit is 35 km/hr, most of them would feel justified to criticize that driver to be in the wrong. They would not say, “The speed limit is just a man-made rule and does not concern objective morality, so I have no right to accuse that driver. Maybe they have a different take on this speed limit thing.”

On what ground do they feel they are entitled to criticize people who speed?

People feel they can criticize others when they have good reason to believe others share the same subjective moral standard.

If moral absolutists have good reason to expect other people to follow the same moral standard, it does not matter whether that standard is objective or subjective, they can do so.

So can moral relativists.

One Medium reader (and writer) recently challenged me on this issue. He says,

If there is no objective moral law, or if there is no way for any of us to know what it is, on what basis can you argue that anyone *should* do anything? — Ronald Kimmons, Dec. 9, 2022

This is my reply:

Moral persuasion depends on whether both parties agree to some fundamental principles. If both parties agree, then they can dialogue and challenge each other. It does not matter whether those principles are objective or subjective. They can still say, “You should do or agree with xyz because of our agreed fundamental moral values.”

It’s ignorant for Christians to tell moral relativists that they should be tolerant of any and all evils committed by others while Christians themselves feel they can “righteously” point fingers at people for violating subjective moral issues. It’s a double standard.

If there is no good reason to expect others to share the same moral values, it’s useless and often presumptuous to criticize them.

This principle applies to both moral relativists and moral absolutists. The difference between them is that moral relativists usually know this principle but moral absolutists like Christians don’t.

Conservative Christians (and some conservative Muslims) often feel they have the right to criticize other people even when there are good reasons to believe others don’t share the same value system. It’s presumptuous.

Gay marriage is the prime example. Many Christians are not satisfied that it’s just them keeping the biblical moral standard. They want everyone, Christian or non-Christian, to obey the Bible on this issue.

And they make a fool of themselves.

It’s obvious that people who don’t believe in the Bible do not feel the need to follow the Bible.

Instead of telling moral relativists that they should not criticize others, Christians (and Muslims as well) are the ones who should restrain themselves from imposing their religious values on others.

The key is to figure out if there is a common ground

The examples I use above (not mowing lawns and speeding) have to do with the laws of a country. We can reasonably expect other citizens to value law adherence, so when our neighbor does not follow the law, we don’t feel the need to tolerate that behavior. We feel justified to approach them and tell them they broke the law, and we expect them to respect the law and correct themselves.

Similarly, concerning other ethical issues not related to the laws of a country, it’s important to establish moral common grounds so people can have constructive conversations.

For almost all people, “consistency in judgment” is good. Hardly anyone argues that consistency does not matter. If you tell Christians who support Donald Trump that they are inconsistent (because they say they value morality, but Trump has done a lot of immoral and often illegal things), even the most shameless ones among them would not say, “So what? I think being inconsistent is good. I like to think of myself as inconsistent.”

What happens when there is no common ground?

Unfortunately, this happens more often than we’d like it to. In such circumstances, force is usually applied to physically restrain one party from carrying out actions that the other party deems wrong. In democratic countries, law enforcement is established to subdue people who break socially-agreed behavioral standards. In international affairs, wars break out when peace talks fail.

There is no room in this essay to discuss this issue in depth. Suffice it to say that if there is no common ground, it is counter-productive to shout “Mine is the absolute moral standard. You should listen.” to the other party.

Conclusion

Thinking of yourself as a moral absolutist usually does no good to you. On the contrary, it can blind you and prevent you from considering where other people come from.

Arguing from the standpoint of moral absolutism usually carries no weight in debates unless both parties agree with the same standard. But if both parties agree, then whether that standard is absolute or subjective does not matter.

If you are not a Medium member yet, please consider signing up using my referral link. I will get a small commission at no extra cost to you.