Jean Twenge’s ‘iGen’ Reeks as an Ageist Relic of Simple-Minded Excess

My expanded review of a low-key dangerous book that only serves to further “dumb down” the endless generational wars

Many authors and researchers have cited Jean Twenge as an authoritative source when studying the differences between American generations. So, as I embarked upon my “Jigsaw Gens” series on intergenerational literacy, I knew I couldn’t pass up the opportunity to read her work.

A psychologist and university professor at San Diego State Univeristy (SDSU), Twenge previously made waves with her 2006 book Generation Me, in which she reportedly dissects and psychoanalyzes Generation Y (“Millennials”). I admittedly haven’t read Generation Me, yet; and, based on Twenge’s commentary in her follow-up, I’m actually dreading the prospect.

Contemporarily, with Generation Z (“Zoomers”) rising in prominence, I decided to check out Twenge’s first crack at evaluating this younger cohort. Published in 2017, iGen: Why Today’s Super-Connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy — and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood gives us a glimpse into the oldest cluster of kids from Gen Z. Building on her previous research, Twenge crafts her arguments based on vibes from interviews she has conducted with Zoomers who were in middle school and high school during the mid-2010s. It isn’t exclusively “vibes,” though; she also incorporates long-range statistics, although numerous conclusions she draws from them are rather dubious.

Normally, I don’t write book reviews that are as lengthy as the one you’re about to read. But the topic material is so close to my heart that, as I did with Justin Baldoni’s Man Enough, I felt compelled to conduct an abnormally-intensive review of it.

WHY YOU SHOULD READ THIS BOOK

With both Millennials and Zoomers emerging into the forefront of American politics, Twenge’s narrative provides some limited insight into where the latter of these two generations might be headed. If you share my passion for LGBT+ equality, it’s especially notable that Zoomers have proceeded to expand pro-Queer activism even beyond the barriers broken by my fellow Millennials.

But you should keep two things in mind. First, Twenge defines Gen Z as spanning from 1995 until 2012. However, a lot of alternate sources have narrowed the Zoomer timespan to those born between 1997 and 2010. As with any generation, these ranges of calendar years are never iron-clad; there’s some flexibility and “wiggle room” for defining when one generation ends and a new one begins. Hence, the value of “microgenerations” (Americans whose birth years straddle the cusps of two adjacent generations).

Secondly, at the time of this book’s publication, Twenge had enthusiasm for labeling Gen Z as “iGen.” While she appears to have backed away from such passion in recent years, I agree with Twenge’s stylistic embrace of the “iGen” moniker. In honoring the original spirit of her narrative, I will synonymously refer to Zoomers as “iGens” throughout this book review.

STYLE / FORMAT

Twenge compiles this introductory tome to iGens over the course of 313 pages. Ten distinct chapters are sandwiched within an Introduction and a Conclusion — both of which are chapter-length and extremely immersive, in and of themselves. Following her Acknowledgements section, Twenge also provides a decent array of bibliographical notes upon which she bases her research.

As I will address, momentarily: Twenge creates a thematic emphasis for each of the ten central chapters based on an attribute or phrase starting with the letter “I.” This is done to emphasize the “I” in “iGen”…and, I have to admit, it’s a pretty spiffy motif.

The content, on the other hand, leaves a lot to be desired. Twenge blends quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis; in several spots, her observations line up with the data. But, in too many places throughout this book, she reaches in a vain effort to ram square pegs into circular holes.

Introduction — entitled “Who is iGen, and How Do We Know?,” the author designates iGens as having been born between the years of 1995 to 2012. Having written this in 2017, Twenge predicts that most authorities will end up agreeing that the youngest half of Gen Z concluded in the year 2012 — although she acknowledges that such an endpoint could be adjusted up or down. She prefaces this admission by expressing how she takes issue with those who define Gen Y as being born between 1980 to 1999…seeing how Twenge views that as too long of a timespan. In comparison, she says, many historians only give Gen X a fourteen-year span (from 1965 up through 1979). However, Twenge’s reasoning here is faulty when we consider how some people born in 1962 might relate better to either Baby Boomers or GenXers. Similarly, some people born in 1980 might relate better to either GenXers or Millennials, whereas some people born in 1996 might relate better to either Millennials or Zoomers. In fact, some people born in 1946 could relate better to either Traditionalists or Baby Boomers. Twenge’s failure to take a pause and acknowledge the concept of “microgenerations” (and, instead, just sort of glide past them) is problematic.

I do indeed agree with Twenge’s reasoning when she identifies the moniker of “Generation Z” to be derivative of Generation X; this is why she endorses journalist Matt Carmichael’s (author of the book Buyographics) usage of “iGen” as neutral and universally appealing. Yet, Twenge proceeds to call them “iGen’ers” throughout the remainder of the book, which is clunky and not much better than the ageist faux-noun of “GenZer.” I suspect that Twenge is basking in her own previous writings, here, as she credits herself with using “iGen” in her 2006 book Generation Me (in which she reportedly drags the Millennial generation through the mud). Given how Twenge then proceeds to “embrace the derivative” within her future (post-2017) writings, this, in hindsight, makes her come off like a bit of a try-hard and a sellout. If she’d used the descriptor of “iGens” rather than the silly and contrived descriptor of “iGen’ers,” it wouldn’t have been such a distracting read for me.

Nonetheless, Twenge does show savvy in how she introduces readers to iGens. Using the examples of Snapchat, iPhones, iPads, Instagram, and Netflix, she makes the case that Zoomers are steeped in more technological proficiency than any generation before them. They are devising new methods for communication, have no tolerance for injustices, and are terrified for their economic futures. Some additional ways in which they have expanded prior trends amongst Millennials include rejecting organized religion in greater numbers and placing more emphasis on their mental health. Since Generation Z was the first cohort to be born into a world with smartphones already in everyone’s hands, these iGens were deeply affected by the surge in popularity of the iPhone around 2011 and 2012 — during which the oldest Zoomers were in their late-teens while the youngest Zoomers had just been born.

Specifically, Twenge delineates ten aspects of life — each starting with the letter “I” — that affect iGens: Those would be In_No_Hurry, Internet, In_Person_No_More, Insecure, Irreligious, Insulated, Income, Indefinite, Inclusive, and Independent. This is pretty brilliant. She proceeds to dedicate each of her ten main chapters to one of these areas. Unfortunately, Twenge tries to defend her research on iGens by pointing out how raw survey questions don’t always tell you the reasons behind respondents’ answers. While this is true, she seems to conveniently forget her own declaration as she proceeds to use that same set of data to fling other broad platitudes about the pre-Zoomer generations with no signs of having followed up on her own research from decades earlier. Twenge makes it a point to say that not all generational changes are uniformly negative…and not all of them can be attributed to just one cause. Yet, her own editorializing in later chapters (mainly against Millennials) belies this truth. Twenge articulates the difference between stereotypes and statistical analyses by seeking database number correlations — but, throughout the rest of the book, she constantly forgets to take her own advice. Fun fact: I, as an “Xennial,” individually scored a 10 out of 15 on her “How iGen Are You?” quiz.

Chapter One — entitled “In No Hurry, Growing Up Slowly,” Twenge draws the correlation that, because iGens are under stricter parental supervision and are less sexually promiscuous, it makes sense that they are dating less and experiencing lower rates of teen pregnancy compared to previous generations. She introduces us to “life history theory,” which posits that whether kids grow up slow or fast is based on their location and time period. iGens are waiting longer to get driver’s licenses, are less likely to walk outside by themselves or stay home alone after school, and spend less time at part-time jobs, volunteering, doing homework, or engaging in extracurricular activities. They tend to ask their parents for money directly, rather than receiving an allowance. This last trend has continued the downward trajectory of financial management skills lacked, successively, by previous generations.

Fewer iGens drink alcohol than previous generations — but Twenge also points out how this can result in standalone surges amongst college-aged iGens when it comes to binge-drinking and drug abuse. She reiterates that we shouldn’t ascribe positive or negative values when viewing these trends. Her theory is that the frontal cortex is underdeveloped amongst iGens because they are being given fewer adult responsibilities. Although Zoomers appear to be running away from home less often and engaging in fewer fights with parents, Twenge characterizes them as “a generation of Peter Pans” who are averse to handling responsibility.

Chapter Two — entitled “Internet: Online Time — Oh, and Other Media, Too,” the author focuses on what she views as the daily obsessions of iGens. These include texting, browsing on smartphones, and frequenting social media sites. Zoomer girls, in particular, are in constant search of *LIKES* across social media — whereas Zoomer boys are more voracious consumers of video games. Also, Twenge finds that iGens are reading less often than previous generations, and she proposes numerous solid ideas for digitizing literacy to “meet them where they are.” Her analysis detects iGens as supplanting traditional TV viewing with online videos, and their visits to movie theaters have likewise dropped.

Chapter Three — entitled “In Person No More: I’m with You, But Only Virtually,” Twenge emphasizes how iGens are going out to parties and hanging out in person with one another far less than previous generations have. Fewer of them are going to the mall or taking love interests out on traditional dates. These activities have been replaced by iGens’ affinity for electronic communication. Twenge is alarmed by this because teenagers who engage in more in-person meetups are less likely to be sad or lonely. She draws a correlation between increased screen time and the rates of depression and suicide amongst Gen Z. To remedy this, Twenge recommends moderation in screen time — as cyberbullying via screens has made youth suicide a lot easier.

Chapter Four — entitled “Insecure: The New Mental Health Crisis,” the author takes her first overt jab at Millennials, alleging that narcissism and overconfidence may have peaked with Gen Y after being exacerbated by Baby Boomers and Gen X. Twenge points to the iGen mental health crisis, based on how surveyed rates of adolescent happiness began to plummet around 2012. Here, I think Twenge has greatly overestimated the (perceived) happiness levels of Gen Y, even though she may be right when diagnosing Gen Z’s fondness for electronic communication to be based on FOMO (Fear of Missing Out). I agree with Twenge’s assessment that smartphone usage can intensify loneliness — and vice versa. However, I believe she is missing the significance of historical and social factors by misconstruing the nuanced ways in which Boomers, Gen X, Gen Y, and Gen Z each view “happiness” within different contexts from the get-go!

Twenge also theorizes that the percentage numbers for loneliness amongst iGen girls are higher than for their male counterparts because girls use social media more than boys. In addition, she suggests that feminine aggression styles are more easily abused via screens and smartphones, which increases opportunities for causing or experiencing anxiety. Instagram and Snapchat have created new pressures related to body image, which is accompanied by objectification and/or misogynistic slut-shaming. Amongst iGen teenagers, girls are beginning to catch up with boys in terms of (achieved) lethal suicide rates. Currently, adults are giving their teens less and less independence. When coupled with how the addictive nature of smartphones leaves less time for sleep, we’ll need more mental health professionals for intervention.

Chapter Five — entitled “Irreligious: Losing My Religion (and Spirituality),” Twenge recalls the significant decline in church attendance or religious belief amongst Millennials (foreshadowed by the GenXers who came before them). These patterns are a reflection of the parents who raised them — and iGens have continued the downward trend. Between 12%-33% of surveyed iGens identify themselves as secular nonbelievers. Twenge notes, however, that there’s still a racial gap with Black Zoomers more likely to subscribe to religion than their White peers. An increase in individualism, says Twenge, may have contributed to the decline in religious believers — as well as the fact that there are so few LGBT-friendly churches, on balance. If congregations wish to retain better youth involvement, she wisely recommends they shift to offering more worldly group discussions rather than exclusively relying upon the model of a clergyperson preaching at their congregation.

Chapter Six — entitled “Insulated But Not Intrinsic: More Safety and Less Community,” the author profiles statistical declines in high school seniors from Gen Z getting into car accidents or receiving speeding tickets. She suggests that these numbers were higher amongst GenXers and Millennials than they are amongst Zoomers because Gen X and Gen Y had experienced greater levels of childhood satisfaction (and, thus, habits that were less guarded) than Gen Z has. Indeed, fewer iGens overall have reported binge-drinking or even sampling alcohol in the first place. Even though these trends had begun to drop throughout Millennials’ adolescence, iGens saw a steep decrease in such behaviors — ostensibly, reasons Twenge, due to their enhanced caution. Acceptance of marijuana has surged amongst iGens (reflecting prior trajectories carried forward by GenXers and Millennials), but even iGens report using marijuana with greater restraint than all of the generations before them — despite iGens viewing marijuana as comparatively safer than alcohol.

There have additionally been declines in physical fights, rape, and sexual assault reported by iGens. However, Twenge raises concern that iGens’ increased focus on emotional safety has led to a misappropriation of “safe spaces” to shield college students from mere discomfort. It results in speakers getting disinvited from campus speaking gigs (as Twenge cites from Jonathan Haidt & Greg Lukianoff’s 2015 article The Coddling of the American Mind, on which they would go on to base their similarly-titled 2018 book), which, in Twenge’s opinion, prevents students from learning. Many iGens embrace the notion that university administrators will serve a similar role to that taken on by their parents during K-12 schooling. Twenge tackles the balancing act between minimizing vs. overreacting — or the difference between infantilizing vs. traumatizing. Part of the emphasis on safetyism is perceived danger, even though kids today are objectively safer than kids in past generations were. She cites Lenore Skenazy’s Free-Range Kids when expressing disenchantment with how so many iGens are struggling at working up their way to confronting fears.

I definitely share Twenge’s alarm at how free speech and resilience are being threatened on some college campuses. Alas, she spends the rest of this chapter leaning into reductionism to overgeneralize the struggles of various generations. Twenge claims that iGens care more about making money than did previous generations because Baby Boomers had the luxury of focusing on “the meaning of life,” whereas she writes off Millennials as scoring high on measures of “narcissism.” Meanwhile, she mourns iGens supplanting that alleged narcissism with their own brand of disengagement and cynicism. While I agree with Twenge that smartphones have contributed to sucking joy out of K-12 and college classrooms, she alleges that Boomers want iGens to explore ideas whereas iGens themselves are laser-focused on finding jobs. She has concluded that iGens claim they want to help others, but they often lack the ability to follow through with altruism or charitable behavior. Yet, she almost immediately backpedals and leaves open the possibility that pushback against Donald Trump could change that. Her hope is tentative, since Twenge views iGen teens who use social media as being pro-equality but less civically participatory. Not only did this prediction age badly (as Zoomers increasingly contributed to America’s voting electorate across the 2018, 2020, and 2022 election cycles) — but it feels like Twenge is hedging in order to preserve and make excuses for her own prejudices about various generations.

Chapter Seven — entitled “Income Insecurity: Working to Earn — But Not To Shop,” Twenge attacks Millennials again by painting them as delusional and selfish in terms of career aspirations, juxtaposed alongside of pragmatism and borderline-apathy from iGens. Then, she also attributes this desire for “interesting” workplaces to have been originally espoused by Boomers and GenXers…but, somehow, Millennials are suddenly the greatest offenders. Twenge is spinning a blatantly ageist narrative, here — essentially saying that Millennials are the true “slackers” (rather than Xers) with the lower work ethic compared, collectively, to Boomers, GenXers, and iGens. Aside from the sparse explanation of how she, as a researcher, defines “work ethic” — Twenge, again, is making such broad proclamations when only a sliver of the Zoomer generation has been surveyed about their attitudes toward the workplace.

Nevertheless, Twenge displays modest sympathy toward iGens for entering a workforce after more than a decade of wages falling behind the cost-of-living while college debt amongst young people soars. She even admits that a lack of data on the entrepreneurial spirit of Baby Boomers and GenXers leaves us speculating somewhat open-endedly as to why entrepreneurial ventures have been decreasing as Millennials segue into iGens. Twenge suspects it has to do with the risk-averse nature of Zoomers plus the thirst for stability in the aftermath of U.S. troops withdrawing from Iraq. Additionally, she implies that The Great Recession of the late-aughts may have intensified the “external locus of control” (i.e., the sense that one has lost control of their destiny in life) amongst iGens, leading to greater occupational resignation.

This is easily the most frustrating chapter of Twenge’s book, as she keeps doubling down on her visualized dichotomy of vapid Millennials alongside of sensible iGens. She points to iGens’ renewed awareness of systemic sexism against women in the workplace, compared to that of Millennials — but she never delves into the Why? of that data, sidestepping the notion that *how* generations were educated differently could be central to that awareness. Instead, she bulldozes ahead with her talking-points of Millennials having lofty expectations and bravado, whereas iGens are purportedly more realistic and less obsessed with celebrity culture. She predicates these assertions on the notion that iGens allegedly embrace capitalism more strongly than Millennials do. Twenge praises iGens for seemingly rejecting the Millennial-heavy priorities of shopping and fashion in favor of directing their consumer energy toward home ownership and vehicular reliability. For these reasons, Twenge dubs iGens as “materialistic nonconformists” who buy things to stand out rather than to fit in — again, with only a few years’ worth of Zoomers’ adult spending habits to actually analyze!

Chapter Eight — entitled “Indefinite: Sex, Marriage, and Children,” the author explores how iGens have been entering romantic relationships later than older generations, although some iGens still participate in hookup culture. They reject the negative stigma of “immorality” associated with premarital sex; fewer iGens (especially Black members of the cohort) report having sex at earlier ages than the generations preceding them; however, Twenge admits that several respondents may exclude oral sex from their definition of sexual activity. She believes this sense of caution regarding the risks of STDs and unplanned pregnancy could be attributed to pop culture programs such as Teen Mom and 16 and Pregnant. But, alternately, Twenge offers that dropping rates of sexual relations amongst iGens are due to less in-person contact or being satisfied with consuming porn. Others might be hesitant to have sex based on trauma from their parents’ divorces, fears over getting hurt, or reluctance to lose their identities.

Twenge expresses skepticism that this iGen aversion to “catching feelings” is healthy…and she points to the problematic trend amongst Gen Z of “ghosting” romantic prospects rather than breaking up with them directly. She observes how iGens often question marriage as an institution — but only because they are open to premarital cohabitation. Raising families has slipped as a priority, most likely due to iGens’ economic fears. Since so many iGens were raised in single-parent households, the idea of getting married later in life has been normalized in their eyes. Furthermore, the rates of single people have also increased amongst both Gen Y and Gen Z. Millennials started the trend of waiting later in life to have children, and iGens are carrying it forward as a potential pattern.

Chapter Nine — entitled “Inclusive: LGBT, Gender, and Race Issues in the New Age,” Twenge establishes how iGens have grown up with LGBT+ people more visible than during the childhoods or teen years of any previous generation. Between 2014 to 2016, a significant number of Millennials and iGens viewed same-sex romantic relations as acceptable — in contrast to the disapproval from GenXers and older generations who were surveyed. Even the iGens who identify as Christian and/or Republican are accepting same-sex marriage in increasing numbers. Another surge is the number of iGens directly identifying as bisexual or transgender, compared to previous generational cohorts. Genderfluidity and “they”-pronouns are also on the rise, although more slowly than what the mainstream media would have the American public believe.

Despite Twenge’s embrace of statistics and trend models, she accuses Millennials of creating a “backlash” against women working outside the home — when, according to Twenge’s own data, it was actually mid-to-younger GenXers who started that temporary trend. It was Boomers who initiated a more even dispersal of gender roles — although that trend hasn’t accelerated nearly as fast as pro-LGBT+ acceptance has. When it comes to perceptions of the Black Lives Matter movement, pro-BLM support amongst Millennials and iGens is noticeably higher than it is for older generations; however, the question of whether racially-integrated communities are “desirable” (rather than merely “acceptable”) has only increased slightly across younger generations. Black and Latine segments of these populations are a little more willing to express that multiracial relations are “desirable” (as opposed to their White counterparts) — although Twenge leaves open the possibility that many respondents just find the wording of the question (acceptability vs. desirability) ridiculous altogether.

When Twenge talks about how White Zoomers are less likely to live in a neighborhood where they’re the racial minority, she suggests that such trends could reflect either the mere “ignorance of youth,” or, conversely, a more extreme white nationalist worldview. She finds that many iGens oppose race-based affirmative action, preferring to see affirmative action based on class instead. Since 1973, each successive generation has been more and more supportive of restricting free speech. Now, students are splitting hairs over whether something should be construed as hateful or offensive. Students who initially support “safe spaces” frequently alter their views after learning about historical dictatorships or censorship. Amongst students at SDSU (where she teaches), Twenge estimates a 75% support rate for the categories of both safe spaces and trigger warnings. Across that same data set, a 16%-30% spread of those students are unforgiving when it comes to racially-insensitive speech or racial statistics being discussed. She criticizes the term “microaggression” as being a misnomer, which is often very subjective to pinpoint and categorize.

Chapter Ten — entitled “Independent: Politics,” the author profiles several iGens who admire the maverick tendencies of either (or both of) Donald Trump and/or Bernie Sanders (but for different reasons). Twenge says that Republicans and Democrats should pay more attention to whether iGens identify as liberal, moderate, or conservative rather than whether they’re actually registered to vote in one of the two major political parties. She also observes how, with the exception of evangelical iGens, even the most conservative members of Gen Z tend to characterize themselves as economically conservative but socially liberal (or socially libertarian). However, she says that the decline of self-identified moderates amongst Zoomers supposedly means the cliché of “People-in-the-middle-getting-run-over” is now true. Twenge leaps to the hasty assertion that there is no room for compromise, as evidenced by the hatred and division within Washington D.C. as well as the rise in self-identified partisans.

In terms of positions, Twenge views iGens as supporting legalized marijuana, being pro-choice on abortion, and opposing capital punishment. While this data, on its face, would seem to place their generation in alignment with Democrats, she adds that iGens oppose gun control and nationalized health care. Although they believe there’s a federal role for combating climate change, Twenge proposes that iGens’ beliefs are largely compatible with the Libertarian Party’s platform. Yet, she goes on to add that iGens diverge from libertarians by supporting federal funds for college education and child care. She highlights the irony of Boomers having benefitted from low-cost tuition when they were younger while they simultaneously shame today’s young people for wanting the same privileges. She quotes Bill Maher to show how out-of-touch this generational archetype (e.g., having contempt for twentysomethings) can be.

Distrust in the government has increased with each new generation, and Twenge paints a portrait of iGens trusting individuals to get things done with better precision than the federal government does. Her overarching point is that iGens seem to have a much greater interest in social issues compared to past generations. Watching TV news — and even reading online news — appears to be decreasing amongst iGens. Yet, Twenge doesn’t see huge trends on the horizon for iGens when it comes to actually voting or other political participation. Given how we’ve seen much of Twenge’s prognostication falling flat over the past six years, it would be interesting to compare these trends amongst the earliest Zoomers (and “Zillennial” cuspers) with those compiled from the mid-to-younger members of their generation.

Conclusion — entitled “Understanding — and Saving — iGen,” Twenge punctuates the reality that iGens have never known a world without the Internet. Consequently, there will have to be some trade-offs. Twenge wishes that there weren’t any “good” or bad” trends per se — and she questions why the trends can’t just exist on their own. That’s a nice sentiment: But her own subtle demonization of Millennials (vis-à-vis the oldest iGens) causes such a sentiment to ring hollow from Twenge.

To be fair, Twenge does have some practical advice for parents raising iGens. In this final chapter, she encourages parents to delay cell phone purchases for their kids, or, at the very least, consider buying their kids a “dumb phone” (i.e., flip phone with no Internet). She also endorses having serious talks with teens about the risks of digital exhibitionism. Twenge embraces greater occasions of in-person interactions as well as antidepressants for those who face mental health obstacles. She wants parents to relax curfews for their teens and insist that their children get a driver’s license (to which Twenge seems oblivious that, in some cases, such a demand could be ableist). University-bound iGens who are less mature might benefit from “gap years” before entering their freshman years of college. In addition, she floats the ideal of revising antibullying policies with common sense. Twenge doesn’t want to see trauma being equated with misunderstandings or minor discomfort.

Most of these suggestions are reasonable, in my view. Sadly, Twenge returns to form in this closing chapter by throwing Millennials under the bus yet again with regurgitated allegations of “narcissism” and “entitlement.” At the same time, she characterizes iGens as delicate little flowers who are doe-eyed and fumbling around in the dark. She offers career guidance for employers who are looking to hire iGens; regrettably, Twenge fails to remind readers how the trajectory for Gen Z could still change, since there were at least eight years’ worth of Zoomers yet to be born at the time this book was sent into print. Overall, she comes off like a parent absent-mindedly showing favoritism toward a younger child over the older children — out of a sense of desperation to finally “get it right.” In this case, the older kids would be Millennials (Gen Y) or some of the kids born into Gen X, while the younger kids would be iGens (Zoomers, or Gen Z).

This book is definitely a mixed bag. I like Twenge’s usage of personal interviews she has conducted with actual individual Zoomers, and I appreciate the fact that she tracks cross-generational trends from surveys answered by high school seniors over the course of multiple decades. But all of this data is of very limited use because only the very oldest members of Gen Z were included in her data set. Twenge seemed to jump the gun out of a desire to beat everyone else to the punch in publishing this book. As a consequence, she has no solid data from mid-to-younger Zoomers — given how they were all under the age of seventeen when this book went to press, so there was only a slice of graduating high school seniors from the Zoomer generation who could be surveyed at that critical juncture in their lives.

On top of that, I suspect that Twenge has blind spots resulting from (as she shares) being the mother of three iGen daughters; her two oldest daughters are Zoomers, and her youngest daughter is part of the Alphacentennial (“Coronazoom”) microgeneration. Outside of her own home life, Twenge is a college professor. She understandably has biases — fondness and frustration alike — toward her own students or the other young people she encounters on her campus. But no single campus (San Diego State University included) is representative of any generation as a whole. Twenge seemingly discards this harsh reality amidst her gusto to be on the frontlines of revolutionizing generational definitions.

In closing, I would recommend this book with EXTREME CAUTION. Recognize the limitations of the data with which Jean Twenge was working when she wrote this. Be aware of what preconceived notions she may harbor. And please employ the same healthy skepticism when reading any of her other books on generational differences — because, if she was willing to finesse such reductionism when Zoomers were barely entering the adult world as a generation…imagine how those sentiments might be extrapolated when she’s reviewing data from more (or all) of respondents who belong to Generation Z.

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