Analysis | Non-aligned powers and food security: Unpacking Brazil’s fertilizer diplomacy under the backdrop of the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Joshua Mayfield

Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 has affected food security throughout the developing world. Ukraine is an important producer of grain and wheat, and it exports agricultural commodities to countries throughout Africa and the Middle East. Russia is a key global fertilizer producer and exporter, which it used as political leverage over the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This has given birth to a new concept in international affairs called “fertilizer diplomacy,” unraveling during some of the worst times of this century, including the global pandemic, food crisis, economic inflation, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In response, non-aligned powers, such as Brazil, are pushing a foreign policy agenda to meet strategic goals in the international system. This is underscored by both the results of the 2022 Brazilian elections and Lula’s strategy of developing relations with the European Union and People’s Republic of China.

Fertilizer prices have subsided after hitting an all-time high on global markets in March 2022, but the commodity remains volatile in international politics today. Fertilizers are an important part of the global economic recovery in emerging markets, as governments across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia are dealing with a global food crisis in a post-Covid-19 era. The case of Brazil’s fertilizer diplomacy indicates that global commodities are taking on greater prominence in the diplomacy of developing countries.

How the war in Ukraine has affected Brazil’s fertilizer supplies

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, global fertilizer supplies have been a critical aspect of Brazil’s economy and foreign policy agenda. Brazilian government officials went to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for what they called “fertilizer diplomacy” in May 2022. Notably, they held talks with counterparts in Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. These diplomatic visits reveal the priority that Brazil is giving to MENA to ensure diversified supplies of fertilizer imports despite concerns over fertilizer import dependency.

Moreover, U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia have not translated into outcomes desired by Western powers. This is evident in Brazil’s dependency on Russia’s fertilizer supplies for its agriculture exports. At the 26th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) held in June 2023, Brazil’s Agricultural Attaché Rafael Guimaraes Requiao sought to manage the fertilizer trade between Russia and Brazil by increasing transparency on issues related to payments for Russia’s fertilizer supplies, notably insurance rates and freight markets. In turn, Brazilian diplomats speculated that bilateral trade could reach a target of ten billion USD in the future.

Brazil has also doubled down on its own efforts to implement a new fertilizer strategy, which former President Jair Bolsonaro unveiled in early 2022. Brazil’s National Fertilizer Plan even proposes to mine potash from underground reserves in the Amazon Rainforest. Its outcome has caused an uproar among worldwide environmental protection advocates and indigenous communities in the country.

Brazil’s fertilizer strategy reflects that global fertilizer markets have become susceptible to geopolitical trends. The country engages in fertilizer diplomacy due to uncertain scenarios in the global fertilizer markets. For instance, the extreme volatility in global fertilizer prices caused several key producer countries to ban exports of fertilizer during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Tensions arising from geopolitical risk and military strategy over the war in Ukraine will determine the outcomes of global fertilizer market scenarios in the future. Belarus is one of the world’s largest producers of potash fertilizers and remains under the influence of Russia’s geopolitical objectives during the invasion. This is likely to have a ripple effect on global commodities markets and other aspects of the raw materials supply chains.

Russia and Brazil are using fertilizer to reshape their diplomatic relationships

Non-aligned countries like Brazil must treat this situation delicately. Global commodities are a critical part of the country’s economic growth and, thus, a vital “carrot-and-stick” toolkit for engaging in diplomacy with other non-aligned states.

Geopolitical risk is a problem for major agriculture producers, who rely on countries like Russia and Ukraine for food and fertilizer imports to meet the supply and production target. As political leverage increases in Russia’s favor, Brazil will seek to carry out this “carrot-and-stick” approach to fertilizer and food exports to influence important political decisions. Those decisions will influence the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda.

Despite the global fertilizer supply shock from the war in Ukraine, it is still important to understand why Brazil must maintain friendly relations with other non-aligned countries on one side, as well as Russia, the United States and European Union on the other side. The non-aligned powers will shape Brazil’s fertilizer strategy in the future, despite Western sanctions on Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Russia has responded to U.S. and EU sanctions by engaging African and Middle Eastern countries with its own version of fertilizer diplomacy. In July 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov began the fertilizer diplomacy African Tour. At the same time, French President Emmanuel Macron and U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer visited the MENA region. Many analysts claim that Lavrov’s tour was primarily about Russia’s guarantees of food and fertilizer supplies to the region. From another point of view, Russia achieved its foreign policy goals in light of tensions with Washington and Brussels over the war in Ukraine.

The votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the war in Ukraine reflected this sentiment: half of all abstentions on the UNGA resolution came from African countries. However, while the United States and France each offered their own aid packages to combat food insecurity in Africa during the 2022 visits, Russia made complementary offers in aid and assistance to African countries in 2023 during the second Russia-Africa Summit.

Brazil’s leading position as a non-aligned power appears to be at stake on the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many countries are reportedly weary of the Brazilian government’s position on the war. For example, the Biden administration condemned some of Lula’s rhetoric as “parroting” to Russian and Chinese interests.

While the country seeks to decrease its dependency on fertilizer imports from Russia, Brazil has yet to demonstrate this fact in its foreign policy agenda. For instance, during a delegation visit to Venezuela in March 2023, Brazil refused a UN resolution put forward by the UN Human Rights Council to condemn human rights abuses in Nicaragua; and at the same time, it refused to send weapons to Ukraine in the war with Russia. These decisions have been regarded as indications of Brazil’s non-alignment path in international affairs today.

How Lula’s victory last year has affected Brazil’s foreign policy agenda

Lula’s three-day visit to China in April 2023 arguably demonstrates that Brazil has returned to the international stage. Lula’s line to the world said it all: “Brazil is back.” What this means for BRICS, however, is that Brazil’s trade relationship with China remains a top priority. Even if Brazil becomes involved in potential peace negotiations in Ukraine, Lula’s government will not undermine the country’s economic interests for the interests of the U.S. and the EU sanctions regimes.

The tone was quite different during a joint press conference held with Brazilian President Lula and EU President Von der Leyen on June 12, 2023. Brazilian diplomats emphasized that a strategic EU-Brazil partnership should go beyond food and fertilizers. The subject of renewable energy was a key topic at the joint press conference, of which Von der Leyen referred to Brazil as a “superpower.”

Brazil wants to play a leading role in the global energy transition, and, to do so, it will need to decrease its dependence on Russian energy and fertilizer supplies. In this context, the national interests of Brazil are inextricably linked to energy and food security dilemmas derived from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Fertilizer is a key crop input for agriculture producers. For this reason, it should be viewed in tandem with food inflation and global commodities markets. Russia will likely continue pushing its version of fertilizer diplomacy on other non-aligned countries, which is likely to cause more volatility in global commodities markets in the near-term. This will exacerbate the situation between Russia and Ukraine — witness the Black Sea Grain Initiative — as the world is likely to deepen its dependence on the two countries for grain and fertilizers regardless of the war’s outcome. This fact should press more governments to engage with non-aligned countries as part of their diplomatic toolkits going forward.

Conclusion

Brazil is going to play a more important role on the international stage in the future. The country’s foreign policy should become more oriented toward the developing world’s economic interests. To increase their trade with non-aligned powers, more countries of the developed world should prioritize climate change action, sustainability goals, and the global energy transition.

Scenarios must be drawn out to understand how this will benefit Brazil’s economic growth. In the short-term, Brazil must increase its leverage over global fertilizer supplies. Brazilian leaders should then use its non-aligned status to encourage more international cooperation to combat global food insecurity, without resorting to methods averse to global food markets, such as Russia’s fertilizer diplomacy.

By using this type of strategic foresight, the long-term dynamics for food prices and global commodities markets should be aligned with non-aligned powers’ foreign policy goals. Those dynamics will play an important role in how countries formulate their strategies and cooperate with one another on an international economic agenda for the future.

Joshua Mayfield works as a legal analyst and language consultant in Mandarin Chinese, French, and Russian. His international relations research background is in U.S.-Australia relations and the Indo-Pacific strategy. He holds a master’s degree in law from Shanghai’s East China Normal University, specializing in China studies. He manages a publication on Medium entitled, Areas & Producers, covering global markets, advanced technologies, and the latest news stories in international business, finance, law, and politics.

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