Why Studying Theories of Truth is so Important

Notes on Alex Bennett’s Theory of Truth Units

After conducting careful studies in contemporary philosophy Alex Bennett has developed and shared here on Medium his emerging theory of truth units. Among the most notable features of his theory is the criticism he poses against relativism; and aside from his criticisms against it, Bennett also offers us many insights into what truth might mean and should mean, in contemporary philosophy.

What does relativism stand for?

Radical forms of relativism posit that neither absolute morality nor knowledge exists as each depends upon individual perspectives or historical contexts. From such a perspective, there are no standard procedures against which we can measure all beliefs, values, and truths as better or worse than one another.

This certainly grants us the freedom to think (or to collect huge amounts of data from a wide range of sources) without making hasty comparisons, which is great. However, determining ultimate truths becomes very difficult.

My major concern about this way of thinking is that it can have consequences in civil discourse and scientific practices, ultimately affecting all areas of knowledge.

For example, strict relativism may impoverish civil dialogues, as there is no need for individuals to come to common understandings. This lack of common ground, I think, may lead to more barriers and echo chambers within society and even within scientific research.

So, is relativism a bad thing?

On one hand, relativism can foster tolerance and respect for diverse perspectives by acknowledging the complexity and diversity of human experience. This consequence of strict relativism is incredibly beneficial and necessary to help transform intolerant or closed societies into tolerant or open ones. Thus, relativism can encourage open-mindedness and a willingness to engage with viewpoints different from one’s own, fostering understanding across cultures and belief systems.

On the other hand, relativism can also lead to moral and scientific impasses, as it suggests that all beliefs and values, including conflicting ones, have equal validity. This may ultimately undermine efforts to address moral and social issues, as there may be no basis for critiquing or challenging harmful practices (at least in an extreme form of relativism).

Bennett understands that under a relativist framework, everyone feels entitled to their own truths and facts. So a philosophy based on truths can be harmful to a society formed by a plurality of opinions?

In response to this line of thinking, I argue that a philosophy based on truth (absolute truth) is not harmful to diverse societies because there is nothing inherently wrong or false about diversity.

Quite the contrary. Mathematics, for example, would only study the number 1 if it didn’t encompass all other elements within it; no species would have evolved, and no one would need to communicate with one another if everyone were equal.

In response to such a provocative statement — that a philosophy based on truth can be harmful to diversity — I pose a question:

Can a society thrive without being based on truth?

Here is my answer: Fortunately, it can, but living in such a manner is akin to gambling dangerously. At some point, we may risk losing everything, including democracy and science, if we don’t agree on anything.

We are now facing a crisis in democracy and science, and relativism can’t help us. Social media “echo chambers” threaten democracy (or the absence of dialogue between different perspectives), and according to researcher John P. A. Ioannidis from Stanford University, almost all scientific articles present false facts or conclusions. However, since he first made this statement, efforts have been made in scientific research to address the crisis.

The connection between contemporary forms of relativism and these two crises arises, in my view, from the potential of relativism to weaken the influence of theories, or discussions about actual truth, which may result in meaningful dialogues between different perspectives in science and society becoming rare.

Thus, this is where Bennett’s perspective, alongside philosophers like him who deal with epistemology, can offer assistance.

How Bennett combats relativism

Bennett tries to grasp units of truth as a combination of specific propositions. He considers claims, tests, evaluations, results, and verdicts as

five elements [or] as atoms that form a molecule. The molecule is a truth unit — a specific belief supported by a specific experience. Truth units accumulate into chains. What we call “the world” (our network of beliefs) can almost entirely be represented by chains of truth units.

This signifies, of course, that there are limits in hypotheses and claims, or in sets of hypotheses and claims, (limits) which we may treat as the set of objects of study. So the set of limited objects, or finitism and atomism, are notions that anyone philosophically involved with such a theory will have to deal with as well.

For instance, let’s examine how his notions work on one of his examples:

• When we eat a fruit once and feel nothing wrong, does it mean it’s safe to eat it again? If it does, then for how many times will this be true?

Bennett would simply say that a chain of truth units must be formed to provide a precise answer to such a question. It sounds obvious and simple, but it is as it should be. When we seek out a nutrition expert, for example, to understand how much soda we can consume, we are searching for someone holding the chain of truths we need to deal with a very specific object: soda. So Bennett, I think, is indeed giving us a good vocabulary we can use — truth units and chains of truth units.

Finitism and pragmatism can offer a solution to relativism but we must be aware of blind spots

It’s very difficult to assert that something has nothing to do with another thing. However, finitism, as a pragmatic approach to problem-solving, emphasizes the importance of focusing on finite, tangible elements and limitations when addressing a complex scheme of causes, exactly like Bennett tried to do with epistemology.

It is indeed very practical to adopt a finitist perspective. However, when misapplied or rigidly adhered to, this finitistic viewpoint can inadvertently lead to the establishment of dogmas and blind spots. When we exaggerately rely on finitism, we might simply exclude something important from our analysis, and that’s also dangerous.

So, despite the effectiveness of finitism, atomism, pragmatism, or empiricism in scientific endeavors, it’s crucial not to rely exclusively on these methodologies. While they provide valuable frameworks for scientific inquiry, they should not preclude the exploration of broader perspectives, opinions, speculations, and cosmological viewpoints. These broader perspectives can foster creativity, innovation, and interdisciplinary collaboration, ultimately pushing the boundaries of knowledge forward.

Final statements

Commenting on philosophy is not as easy as it seems. I hope much what I commented on here will be researched by the readers for a deeper understanding of all the subjects that I dealt with here in a very summarized manner: the crisis in science, echo chambers, pragmatism, relativism, Bennett’s theory of truth units, and other elements of epistemology.

I’m also very happy to finally comment on the ideas of a colleague who has the courage and the inventiveness to come up with a new theory of truth, and hopefully, I will do it again more extensively.

Special thanks to Marcus aka Gregory Maidman, for his recent reading suggestion that heavily contributed to this essay, and for all the editing tips he always gives me.