avatarJames Marinero, MSc, MBA

Free AI web copilot to create summaries, insights and extended knowledge, download it at here

4388

Abstract

an effort to split Ukraine’s defensive capability. It’s unlikely that Putin now has the forces and equipment to do this without Belarus involvement. It’s thought that Lukashenko is too canny and his hold on power too precarious for such an adventure. There have long been rumblings that his <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/russias-ally-belarus-lukashenko-faces-wrath-of-own-military-for-involvement-in-war-articleshow.html">military top brass are against it</a>.</p><p id="ed93">Putin could twist his arm, severely, putting Lukashenko between a rock and a hard place.</p><p id="383d">For Putin, re-opening the northern front in Ukraine would still keep NATO formally out of the war (although already heavily engaged in weapons supply).</p><h1 id="b57c">An alternative?</h1><p id="fac5">Putin could go for broke and open a second front elsewhere, a new front that would seriously test NATO’s resolve and commitment to Article 5 of the NATO (Washington) Treaty: All for One and One for All.</p><ul><li>Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.</li><li>The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.</li></ul><h1 id="1022">Options</h1><p id="17d7">Putin is running out of options.</p><ul><li>He could use one tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, but that would trigger events outside his control. Potential nuclear war.</li><li>He could open a second conventional front in the Suwalki Gap. Conventional war with NATO.</li><li>He could re-attack Ukraine from Belarus, with Belarus.</li></ul><p id="ec10">Of course, any list of options should include the ‘do nothing’ option. That is, just carry on with business as usual. Except that a withdrawal from Kherson has been announced.</p><p id="ee4f">Which will it be?</p><p id="864b">‘Business as usual’ is clearly not working, despite the use of Iranian drones (can Iran build them as fast as Putin is losing them)? or despite the fact that Russia is bringing Lukashenko’s T72 tanks into the battle.</p><div id="36f7" class="link-block"> <a href="https://t.me/ukrainewarintelligence/13873"> <div> <div> <h2>Ukraine War - Intel News</h2> <div><h3>Belarus continues to transfer its military equipment to the troops of the Russian Federation: a train with 20 BMP-2s…</h3></div> <div><p>t.me</p></div> </div> <div> <div style="background-image: url(https://miro.readmedium.com/v2/resize:fit:320/0*nzjwh0o-d5dZyW1k)"></div> </div> </div> </a> </div><p id="d292">He clearly has to do something different.</p><p id="e317">Doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different result is a sign of stupidity.</p><p id="9a67">And I may not have identified all the options from my amateur armchair.</p><h1 id="b622">Where?</h1><p id="4414">One obvious place is the Suwalki Gap.</p><p id="1b16">The Suwalki Gap is a 60-mile corridor between Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland. The region is of strategic importance because it is the only land route between the Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, and the rest of Russia.</p><p id="6f10">It’s just down the road from Putin’s birthplace, St Petersburg (or Leningrad as then was).</p><p id="d6f6">Many experts call the Suwałki Gap (also known as the Suwałki corridor) strategic for NATO. This Gap is the area around the cities of Suwałki, Augustów, and Sejny, which connects Poland with Lithuania and other Baltic states and, at the same time, separates the Kaliningrad region of Russia from Belarus.</p><div id="156d" class="link-block"> <a href="https://newsrnd.com/news/2022-06-22-%22nato-s-achilles-heel%22--military-expert-explains-the-importance-of-kaliningrad.SyP6ElZcc.html"> <div> <div> <h2>"NATO's Achilles heel": Military expert explains the importance of Kaliningrad</h2> <div><h3>"NATO's Achilles heel": Military expert explains the importance of Kaliningrad Created: 06/22/2022, 21:50 By: Tom…</h3></div> <div><p>newsrnd.com</p></div> </div> <div> <div style="background-image: url(https://miro.readmedium.com/v2/resize:fit:320/0*Rvm

Options

NNjavd-QZNDX5)"></div> </div> </div> </a> </div><p id="6c96">Indeed, <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/russia-ukraine-war-unearthed-footage-broadcast-on-russian-tv-has-shown-how-putin-planned-to-invade-baltic-states/NIASI2KK5ZWYMXQBH23YQG7HJY/">Russian TV has war-gamed</a> such an invasion.</p><h1 id="a974">Why?</h1><p id="2ea9">Putin has long seen the Baltic states as Russian and has said so in several speeches. He wants to bring them back into the arms of Mother Russia.</p><div id="ae34" class="link-block"> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/22/putin-speech-russia-empire-threat-ukraine-moscow"> <div> <div> <h2>Putin's speech harked back to Russia's empire - the threat doesn't end with Ukraine | Keir Giles</h2> <div><h3>ladimir Putin's lengthy speech justifying the dismemberment of Ukraine said much about him but also contains chilling…</h3></div> <div><p>www.theguardian.com</p></div> </div> <div> <div style="background-image: url(https://miro.readmedium.com/v2/resize:fit:320/0*sVOll111fe4F20_Z)"></div> </div> </div> </a> </div><p id="cd5f">But there is also, arguably, a tactical (strategic?) advantage as opening that front would potentially split NATO support and resources.</p><p id="c588">Russia has been reinforcing its military capability in the region <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/Russia-Is-Reinforcing-3-Crucial-Geopolitical-Frontlines/articleshow/45876452.cms">since 2015</a>, and that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-belarus-threatens-baltics-poland-says-lithuanian-president-2022-02-17/">continued</a> even as Russian forces moved in to Ukraine in February 2022.</p><h1 id="1257">When?</h1><p id="ed67">A tough question. NATO has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/02/nato-baltic-states-sea-russia-military-defense/">recognised</a> its relative weakness in the Baltic and has been slowly building its force strength there through 2022.</p><p id="0392">Obviously, the longer Putin waits then the tougher it will be for his forces to succeed in driving through the Suwalki Gap.</p><p id="48c0">Politically I doubt whether he would survive a full year of the Ukraine War without some significant victory to point to or without a significant escalation.</p><p id="6b91">Things must surely come to a head within the next three months.</p><p id="d76a">Would Putin really drag NATO into a face-to-face war?</p><p id="c8ad">What has he got to lose?</p><p id="0b7f"><i>About me: If you follow me I guarantee variety in your inbox with some unusual perspectives! I write on a wide range of topics including humor, tech, space, geopolitics and travel, together with daily news events and the minutiae of my daily life living on a boat. Yes, I really do live on a boat (some readers don’t believe that). I also write about…</i></p><p id="2923"><b>…the options of madmen</b></p><p id="fea5"><i>If you appreciate stories like these and want to support other writers and me, consider signing up to become a Medium member. It’s only $5 a month, giving you unlimited access to incredible stories on Medium. If you sign up using my link below, I’ll earn a small commission at no extra cost to you.</i></p><div id="f238" class="link-block"> <a href="https://james-marinero.medium.com/membership"> <div> <div> <h2>Join Medium with my referral link - James Marinero</h2> <div><h3>Read every story from James Marinero (and thousands of other writers on Medium). Your membership fee directly supports…</h3></div> <div><p>james-marinero.medium.com</p></div> </div> <div> <div style="background-image: url(https://miro.readmedium.com/v2/resize:fit:320/0*fRu_QZyP0o-Wa1lS)"></div> </div> </div> </a> </div><p id="f88c"><i>Or maybe just <a href="https://ko-fi.com/jamesmarinero">buy me a coffee?</a> and tell me what you liked reading (or not)!</i></p><figure id="67c2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.readmedium.com/v2/resize:fit:800/1*F7CRvNpnsbM3yYySfOeIjA.png"><figcaption></figcaption></figure></article></body>

Military Strategy and Geopolitics

Ukraine War: Will Russia Open a Second Front?

Hitler did it in World War 2 when he reached stalemate with the United Kingdom, so why not now for Putin?

Plan of battle of Operation Sealion, the cancelled German plan to invade England in 1940. Image credit: By User:Wereon — Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6396911

As I publish this on 11 November, I realise that it is Armistice Day, the remembrance of the fallen in two World Wars.

And I wonder if we are facing a Third World War.

This story is not an analysis of the likelihood of a third world war, but a look at the possibility that Putin could open a second front.

Where? When? How? I’ll get to my views on that later, but first some history.

June 1940

It was June 1940 and the German Reich had reached stalemate in Western Europe. The Atlantic Wall began construction and the United Kingdom, its nose bloodied after Dunkirk, did not have the capability to launch an invasion of France.

Remember, the United States was not a belligerent at that time despite Churchill’s best efforts to draw them in. It would be eighteen months more, in December 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and the seeds of Axis defeat were finally sown.

In September 1940 Hitler visited the coast of France and looked across the Channel at England, just 26 miles away. At that moment he lost his appetite for Operation Sealion, to launch an invasion of the United Kingdom, apparently as his preconditions for invasion were not met (total air and naval superiority over the English Channel).

Soon afterwards he decided to renege on his non-aggression pact with Stalin. Operation Barbarossa was launched and Germany attacked Russia, opening the Eastern Front.

The war became a two-front war.

According to military terminology, a two-front war occurs when opposing forces encounter on two geographically separate fronts. The forces of two or more allied parties usually simultaneously engage an opponent in order to increase their chances of success. The opponent consequently encounters severe logistic difficulties, as they are forced to divide and disperse their troops, defend an extended front line, and is at least partly cut off from their access to trade and exterior resources. However, by virtue of the central position, they might possess the advantages of the interior lines — Wikipedia

Could Putin do the same?

He’s tried it already, on 24 February 2022 when his forces crossed into Ukraine from Belarus. He withdrew with a bloody nose, and now there is only one front wrapping around south east Ukraine.

Recently Russia has been pouring more troops and matériel into Belarus and there has been speculation that he is trying to draw Belarus into the war.

Yes, he could do it again in an effort to split Ukraine’s defensive capability. It’s unlikely that Putin now has the forces and equipment to do this without Belarus involvement. It’s thought that Lukashenko is too canny and his hold on power too precarious for such an adventure. There have long been rumblings that his military top brass are against it.

Putin could twist his arm, severely, putting Lukashenko between a rock and a hard place.

For Putin, re-opening the northern front in Ukraine would still keep NATO formally out of the war (although already heavily engaged in weapons supply).

An alternative?

Putin could go for broke and open a second front elsewhere, a new front that would seriously test NATO’s resolve and commitment to Article 5 of the NATO (Washington) Treaty: All for One and One for All.

  • Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.
  • The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Options

Putin is running out of options.

  • He could use one tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, but that would trigger events outside his control. Potential nuclear war.
  • He could open a second conventional front in the Suwalki Gap. Conventional war with NATO.
  • He could re-attack Ukraine from Belarus, with Belarus.

Of course, any list of options should include the ‘do nothing’ option. That is, just carry on with business as usual. Except that a withdrawal from Kherson has been announced.

Which will it be?

‘Business as usual’ is clearly not working, despite the use of Iranian drones (can Iran build them as fast as Putin is losing them)? or despite the fact that Russia is bringing Lukashenko’s T72 tanks into the battle.

He clearly has to do something different.

Doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different result is a sign of stupidity.

And I may not have identified all the options from my amateur armchair.

Where?

One obvious place is the Suwalki Gap.

The Suwalki Gap is a 60-mile corridor between Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland. The region is of strategic importance because it is the only land route between the Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, and the rest of Russia.

It’s just down the road from Putin’s birthplace, St Petersburg (or Leningrad as then was).

Many experts call the Suwałki Gap (also known as the Suwałki corridor) strategic for NATO. This Gap is the area around the cities of Suwałki, Augustów, and Sejny, which connects Poland with Lithuania and other Baltic states and, at the same time, separates the Kaliningrad region of Russia from Belarus.

Indeed, Russian TV has war-gamed such an invasion.

Why?

Putin has long seen the Baltic states as Russian and has said so in several speeches. He wants to bring them back into the arms of Mother Russia.

But there is also, arguably, a tactical (strategic?) advantage as opening that front would potentially split NATO support and resources.

Russia has been reinforcing its military capability in the region since 2015, and that continued even as Russian forces moved in to Ukraine in February 2022.

When?

A tough question. NATO has recognised its relative weakness in the Baltic and has been slowly building its force strength there through 2022.

Obviously, the longer Putin waits then the tougher it will be for his forces to succeed in driving through the Suwalki Gap.

Politically I doubt whether he would survive a full year of the Ukraine War without some significant victory to point to or without a significant escalation.

Things must surely come to a head within the next three months.

Would Putin really drag NATO into a face-to-face war?

What has he got to lose?

About me: If you follow me I guarantee variety in your inbox with some unusual perspectives! I write on a wide range of topics including humor, tech, space, geopolitics and travel, together with daily news events and the minutiae of my daily life living on a boat. Yes, I really do live on a boat (some readers don’t believe that). I also write about…

…the options of madmen

If you appreciate stories like these and want to support other writers and me, consider signing up to become a Medium member. It’s only $5 a month, giving you unlimited access to incredible stories on Medium. If you sign up using my link below, I’ll earn a small commission at no extra cost to you.

Or maybe just buy me a coffee? and tell me what you liked reading (or not)!

Ukraine War
Geopolitics
Military
Russia
Military Strategy
Recommended from ReadMedium