The #Election2016 Micro-Propaganda Machine

š±Real Sources / Fake News
After finding evidence that much of the āfakeā and hyper-biased news traffic during šŗšø#Election2016 was arriving through direct hyperlinks, search engines, and āold schoolā sharing tactics such as email newsletters, RSS, and instant messaging, I thought I would do a small ābig dataā project.
I wrote this piece because I feel the argument about Facebookās role in influencing the outcome of the U.S. election doesnāt address the real problem: the sources of the fake/misleading/hyper-biased information. Sure, Googleās ad network and Facebookās News Feed/āRelated Storiesā algorithms amplify the emotional spread of misinformation, and social media naturally turn up the volume of political outrage. At the same time, I think journalists, researchers and data geeks should first look into the factors that are actually 1) producing the content and 2) driving the online traffic.
Rather than analyze āknown unknownsā with incomplete metrics and partial analytics (i.e., measuring the famously opaque Facebook engagement metrics), this analysis looks directly at the source.
āWelcome to the Micro-Propaganda Machine
Thereās a vast network of dubious ānewsā sites. Most are simple in design, and many appear to be made from the same web templates. These sites have created an ecosystem of real-time propaganda: they include viral hoax engines that can instantly shape public opinion through mass āreactionā to serious political topics and news events. This network is triggered on-demand to spread false, hyper-biased, and politically-loaded information.
For this analysis, Iām calling it āfake news.ā
Itās what I term the #MPM: the āmicro-propaganda machineā ā an influence network that can tailor peopleās opinions, emotional reactions, and create āviralā sharing (šLOL/haha/š”RAGE) episodes around what should be serious or contemplative issues. The increasing influence of this type of behavioral micro-targeting and emotional manipulation ā data-driven āpsyopsā ā has become more noticable as people begin to reflect on the outcome of the recent #Brexit and U.S. election.
In my previous post, I found that only ~60% of incoming traffic from a sample of leading āfakeā and hyper-biased news sites seemed to be coming out of Facebook and Twitter. The remaining ~40% of web traffic was organic ā coming from direct website visits, P2P shares, text/instant messaging, subscription e-newsletters, RSS, and search engines. Again: Less than 0.1% of the traffic to the sites I looked at came from display advertising or (known) paid search content.







My guess was that this network ā the #MPM ā of small āfakeā and hyper-biased sites has been pushing traffic through links ā and helping to inject this content into platforms like Facebook and Twitter. This effort was likely ramped up around the time the šŗšø#Election2016 primaries concluded, as well as any time a new political issue (involving email servers, groin grabbing, immigrants, etc.) takes place.
The data in my last piece showed mail.google.com (š§Gmail) being one of the top āupstreamā sources of traffic coming into Infowars.com, an influential player in the right-wing news sphere. For this project, I did a medium-scale data analysis ā crawling and indexing 117 websites that are known to be associated with the propagation of fake news content and the spread of what Iām calling āhyper-biasedā propaganda.
For the purposes of looking directly at what some have termed the āalt-rightā political propaganda machine, I kept the sources in this analysis restricted to sites that have been šÆā ļøpublicly called out by internet users and listed by editors on the following verification sites: Snopes, Fake News Watch, Real or Satire, and Media Bias Fact Check.
Due to the sensitivity of this type of research, I feel complete transparency is key: Below is my list of the 117 sites I scraped and indexed in my #MCM election data project.
I crawled š· every website on the list and extracted URLs one ālevelā deep. This scraping effort, given the relatively basic structure of these template-based websites, represents the majority of links on these sites (735,263 of them, to be exact).

šAfter a couple of hours, my scraping/indexing effort resulted more than 11,033 webpages, and 735,263 hyperlinks. Out of this data set, there were 80,587 hyperlink connections āaka shared URLS ā across the 117 fake news websites.
Where does the #MPM point? What does it look like?
I looked for patterns in the shared links to find what places these fake news websites seem to be linking to, as well as their most common inbound link destinations, and the structure of how the #MCM was embedded across the wider šŗšø#Election2016 mediascape.
{After exporting the dataset (.gexf file), I sorted out the news ānetworkā at the widest scale using an open source tool, GEPHI, and the ForceAtlas2 algorithm. Any website with at least two shared URLs (links) to them from the 117 sites on my list above appear in my #MPM network graph. There were just over 2000 sites in the network, and all data obtained was publicly available and appeared on the websites as of 17-Nov-2016}
Legend
The circle, or ānode,ā size on the following graph(s) is proportional (1ā100 scale) to the number of shared hyperlinks that link into the site from the 117 website sample. The colors are sorted according to actor type.
Red=š“right-wing media; Purple=āgovernment entities; Yellow=š¤interesting things; Blue=šµsocial media; Green=ā³ļøeducation; and the less prominent nodes were left gray.
#ICYMI
The following website data map, called a network graph, can be used reflect on #Election2016. It can help us discover:
- The š influential sites that are central to information flow in the micro-propaganda network. From a social influence perspective, this data helps us find which sites drive conspiracy/misinformation/āfakeā and āviralā content/propaganda online, and see how each is positioned on the internet and;
- šWhere and āhow this micro-propaganda machine tends to coordinate its resources. By displaying network-level patterns in how these sites are linked to one another, and showing how dense their connections (āedgesā) are, we can visualize how this propaganda network is positioned āaroundā other actors, such as the ālamestream mediaā and āmainstreamā social media platforms.
{What this data cannot show ā at least, directly ā is why these links exist or exactly when they were established. To put it simply, this map can show us the frequency and direction of āfake newsā relationships, but canāt display the complete nature of the connections.}

















