avatarJames Marinero, MSc, MBA

Summary

The article discusses the inefficacy of reactive armor on Russian tanks in the face of advanced anti-tank missiles and drones during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Abstract

The article examines the unexpected vulnerability of Russian tanks equipped with reactive armor in the conflict in Ukraine. Despite the use of modern reactive armor systems, such as explosive reactive armor (ERA), Russian tanks are sustaining significant losses. This is attributed to the use of advanced anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) like the Javelin and NLAW, which employ top-attack modes to bypass the armor. The author explores the history and mechanics of reactive armor, the evolution of anti-tank weapons, and the tactical implications of these developments, including the impact on tank crew morale and the effectiveness of traditional armored warfare strategies. The article also touches on the use of drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar, in anti-tank roles and provides an update on reported Russian tank losses.

Opinions

  • The author initially underestimated the effectiveness of modern anti-tank weapons against reactive armor, highlighting a gap in their understanding.
  • There is a suggestion that Russia may have deployed older tanks or those with less experienced crews in the initial stages of the invasion.
  • The article implies that the effectiveness of reactive armor is limited against the latest warheads, particularly in top-attack scenarios.
  • The author expresses empathy for Russian tank crews facing overwhelming odds and suggests that morale issues, such as killing commanders or desertion, may be a response to the perceived inadequacy of their armor.
  • The author indicates a preference for naval service over the risks associated with tank warfare based on the vulnerability of tanks to modern weaponry.
  • The article criticizes the assumption that reactive armor is sufficient protection against all threats, emphasizing the need for a reevaluation of armored vehicle design in light of current combat experiences.

Ukraine

Russian Tanks — Whatever Happened to Reactive Armour?

We’ve seen the pictures of trashed Russian tanks on the road to Kyiv, but what’s really puzzling me is the failure of reactive armour

A Russian built T-72 tank layered with reactive armour bricks. Georgian Army. Image credit: 1st Lt. Justin Colvin, Marine Forces Europe, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Are all the Russian tanks with reactive armour on the Eastern Front in Ukraine? Did Putin send the oldest tanks from Belarus into the attack on Kyiv, with conscript crews?

Maybe, or maybe I’m making a wrong assumption. Perhaps tanks with reactive armour were sent south from Belarus to Kyiv. I looked into the issue of armour versus missiles.

I’d heard about reactive armour several years ago and decided this week to dig deeper because I could not understand how the Russians were losing so many tanks.

What is reactive armour?

I thought it was just exploding tiles, but anyway I turned to Wikipedia, that fount of all knowledge.

It is most effective in protecting against shaped charges and specially hardened kinetic energy penetrators. The most common type is explosive reactive armour (ERA), but variants include self-limiting explosive reactive armour (SLERA), non-energetic reactive armour (NERA), non-explosive reactive armour (NxRA), and electric armour. NERA and NxRA modules can withstand multiple hits, unlike ERA and SLERA, but a second hit in exactly the same location may potentially penetrate any of those, as the armour in that spot is compromised.

So, there’s a bit more to it than I first thought. A lot more. Electric armour too?

The advanced Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour on this Russian-built T-90S is arranged in pairs of plates, giving the turret its prominent triangular profile. Indian Army. cell105, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Some history

The use of active armour began in the 1970s with the development of explosive reactive armour (ERA). ERA uses a layer of explosives to detonate and deflect incoming missiles or shells. The first tanks equipped with ERA were produced in the 1980s. That’s what I knew about, until now.

In the 1990s, a new type of anti-tank missile called “explosive formed penetrator” (EFP) was developed. EFP uses a shaped charge to penetrate tank armour, and ERA had to evolve to meet the threat. I’d heard about these too, spraying gouts of molten copper inside a tank and incinerating everything. Molten copper and tank ammunition don’t mix well. Nor with people.

Tank crews have to believe that they have a reasonable chance of surviving a hit. Otherwise there will be problems with discipline — and we’ve heard about some of those recently in the Russian army.

Image credit: Wikipedia

Active armour is a very effective protection against most types of attacks, but it has some drawbacks.

First, the weight of the armour increases the overall weight of the vehicle, which can reduce its speed and maneuverability. This is because the tank also has to have armour to protect it from it own exploding armour. I’d wondered about that.

Second, the added weight can also reduce the tank’s ability to cross bridges and other obstacles and also increases fuel consumption.

Finally, active armour can be expensive to produce and maintain.

Also, the traditional war image of a tank moving forward with close support infantry has to change, because the exploding armour creates a shrapnel risk for the infantry if the tank is struck by a projectile.

But still the road to Kiev is littered with wrecked tanks, even the most modern T-90s.

And the reason for that carnage is nothing to do with a lack of active armour.

It’s called top attack.

Javelins and NLAWs

The Javelin is a US-made anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and the NLAW is a Swedish/British ATGM. They are a “fire and forget” weapons, so that once fired, the operator does not need to do anything else to guide it to the target and can immediately move location and seek cover.

A member of 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, live firing an NLAW. Image credit: Ministry of Defence, OGL v1.0OGL v1.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Both are capable of direct or top-attack (flyover). With the top-attack profile, the missiles can ascend to 150 metres and then dive down into a tank’s turret.

Both are in widespread use in the Ukraine.

Here’s a quick and dirty graphic I put together to illustrate the concepts:

A member of 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, live firing an NLAW. Image credit: Ministry of Defence, OGL v1.0OGL v1.0, via Wikimedia Commons; German Leopard tank Credit: https://unsplash.com/@schildpaddie; Graphic: James Marinero. Plays every 4 seconds.

The HEAT warheads are capable of defeating modern tanks by hitting them from above — the so-called top-attack — where their armour is thinnest.

High explosive anti-tank (HEAT) Warhead. 1: Aerodynamic cover; 2: Air-filled cavity; 3: Conical liner; 4: Detonator; 5: Explosive; 6: Piezo-electric trigger. Image credit: Robert Blazek, Pezinok, Slovakia, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

It’s no wonder that Russian tank crews were killing their commanders or running away.

Destroyed Russian T-90A tank. Reactive armour clearly visible in right hand picture. A top-attack? Image source: https://i.postimg.cc/4dtYkZVp/43.png via Oryxspioenkop.com

Russia’s highly effective anti-tank missile, the 9M133 Kornet came into production after the Soviet Union collapsed, and so there are none of these MANPADS in the current Ukrainian arsenal.

Drones too

Ukraine has been using the Turkish made Bayraktar drone to great effect as an active tank destroyer.

Top-attack again.

Russian tank losses

As of time of writing, Russian tank losses in the Ukraine are reported by Oryx to be : 448, of which destroyed: 219, damaged: 6, abandoned: 41, captured: 182

And yes, it seems that almost all Russian tanks have some kind of reactive armour:

Explosive reactive armour has been valued by the Soviet Union and its now-independent component states since the 1980s, and almost every tank in the eastern-European military inventory today has either been manufactured to use ERA or had ERA tiles added to it, including even the T-55 and T-62 tanks built forty to fifty years ago, but still used today by reserve units. — Wikipedia

We do not have a ratio of ATGMs fired to tank kills for the Ukraine war, so it’s not really supportable to say that the Russian ERA is ineffective. But I’m inclined to believe that it is.

So, my puzzle is solved

Having considered all the aspects that I have discovered, it seems that reactive armour in whatever form, is just not up to the job of defending against the latest warheads in top attack mode. And with top attacks there is little chance for the tank crews.

If I had to choose, I think I’d rather be in the Navy.

Planes crash, tanks blow up. And yes, ships sink. But they do have lifeboats.

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Ukraine
Russia
Tank
Armoured Vehicles
Armour
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