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Summary

The article critiques the argument that HR1, a comprehensive democracy reform bill, should be slimmed down to gain bipartisan support, particularly from Senator Joe Manchin, arguing instead for its necessity in full to combat anti-democratic strategies by Republicans.

Abstract

The author of the article dismisses the notion that HR1, also known as the "For the People Act," should be stripped down to its core elements to secure passage with bipartisan support, particularly from key centrist Senator Joe Manchin. The bill is described as a multi-layered approach to democracy reform, including voter protections, an end to partisan gerrymandering, and measures to reduce the influence of big money in politics, along with enhancements to election security and ethics reforms. The author asserts that the Republican strategy at the state level is to rig the electoral system against Democrats, making bipartisan support for HR1 unlikely. The article posits that Senator Manchin should recognize this existential threat to democracy and support an exception to the filibuster to pass HR1 in its entirety, as slimming down the bill would not align with the anti-corruption and pro-democracy stances he has historically supported.

Opinions

  • The author believes that the argument for slimming down HR1 to gain bipartisan support is "plainly malarky" and not grounded in the facts of the current political climate.
  • The article suggests that Senator Joe Manchin's pursuit of bipartisanship is misguided given the Republican strategy to block democracy reform and rig the electoral system against Democrats.
  • It is argued that the Republican Party's efforts to make it harder for Democrats to vote and have their votes count equally are indicative of a strategy to "rig the system against the majority," which necessitates a comprehensive approach like HR1.
  • The author contends that Manchin's historical support for anti-corruption measures and his opposition to the influence of big money in politics should lead him to support HR1 in full, including its provisions for small-dollar funded campaigns.
  • The article emphasizes that the existential threat posed by Republican efforts in the states justifies an exception from the Senate's filibuster rule for democracy reform legislation.
  • The author criticizes the "chatterati" for focusing on self-aggrandizing arguments rather than advocating for the exceptional treatment of democracy reform in the face of the filibuster.
  • It is proposed that passing only certain layers of HR1 would defend the Democratic Party, but passing the entire bill, including Layer 3, would protect democracy itself.

HR1: The “skinny bill” silliness

There’s a non-sequitur posing as an argument, gaining traction among the chatterati. That “argument” is expressed best in a tweet by the great Nate Silver:

This argument has been echoed by colleagues and friends. It has become “the reasonable view,” the sort of thing sensible-types think and say.

It also is plainly malarky.

HR1 draws together many reforms, for sure. But Silver’s argument presumes that there is a core that could garner a sufficient majority, but that that majority is being jeopardized by the other bits that have been added on.

This “argument” has no relation to the facts.

HR1 is a three-layer cake—with plenty of icing dolloped on top.

Layer 1 is John Lewis’s Voter Empowerment Act (plus other voter protections), which would effectively reverse many of the efforts by Republicans in the states to make it harder for Democrats to vote.

Layer 2 is the idea suggested by Chief Justice Roberts in Rucho v. Common Cause: An end to partisan gerrymandering through the exercise of Congress’s Election Clause power.

Layer 3 is a suite of reforms — from transparency requirements to the first system to enable small-dollar funded congressional campaigns—to weaken the power of big money in Washington.

And finally, the icing on this cake is a gaggle of election security (Title III) and ethics reforms (Titles VI, VII, VIII, IX and X) that would radically increase the integrity of Congress, the Court, and the Executive, as well as increase the public’s confidence in the integrity of our elections.

Silver’s argument would make sense if it were plausible that Manchin was resisting HR1 because he likes Layer 1 or Layer 2, but doesn’t like Layer 3 or the icing on the HR1 cake.

Yet that idea has nothing to do with what Manchin has actually said.

Manchin remains enamored of the idea that Congress might pass democracy reform in a bi-partisan way. He has been working hard to generate support for a bill that would indeed have bi-partisan support. That was the gambit with his revised H.R.4. Too bad that that trojan horse is likely (as Guy Charles and I have argued) unconstitutional, at least in the eyes of this Court.

But nothing will happen in Congress unless Manchin’s colleagues succeed in convincing him that bi-partisanship on democracy reform is just not going to happen. (There’s a Mean Girls meme here that I’ll leave to the side). The core strategy of Republicans in Congress is to block democracy reform— because the core strategy of the Republicans in the states is to do everything they can to make it harder for Democrats to vote and have their votes count equally. From the more than 350 election law bills now being considered in Republican legislatures across the country, to the gerrymandering in Republican legislatures that is just getting going, the clear strategy of the Republican Party is to rig the system against Democrats. And given that strategy, there is nothing in HR1 (save maybe Layer 3 plus the icing) that the Republican Party in Congress will ever join to pass.

I don’t know Joe Manchin’s heart. But were I Joe Manchin, I would be asking myself whether Republicans in the states are being as insistent on bipartisanship as he is being in Congress. Are their efforts to rig the system against Democrats the careful product of kumbaya politicians, keen to find common ground between the parties? Or are they instead the manifestation of plain hardball politics, by a party that realizes that the only way it wins is if it rigs the system against the majority.

Because if that is indeed the Republican’s strategy—to rig the system against the majority—then the idea of bi-partisanship here simply makes no sense. They want to kill majoritarianism. They’re not going to agree on reforms that will make their objective more difficult.

It is only if Manchin can be brought to see this that there is any chance of any democracy reform in this Congress. And even that chance requires an even more difficult step if it is to occur: For not only must Manchin realize that bipartisanship is not going to happen, he must also realize that this threat to majoritarianism justifies an exception from the Senate’s filibuster rule.

Put differently, once he sees their strategy clearly, he must then see a higher principle demands that he agree to evade the filibuster in this case at least. The Republicans (in the states) are already exercising their partisan power to defeat the opportunity for a majority in the states to have its will expressed in Congress. The rules in Congress cannot require a super-majority to defend against this fundamentally anti-democratic move.

That means that the only hope for reform in this Congress rests on Manchin agreeing to except democracy reform from the reach of the filibuster. I’m not saying that’s likely. I’m saying that’s what’s necessary.

And it is here that we can see why Silver’s argument just makes no sense. No sensible view can believe that the Senate is going to muster 60 votes for any meaningful voting rights bill. The only gambit is to except democracy reform from the filibuster. That requires Manchin being convinced of something he is apparently not yet convinced of.

But if Manchin can be convinced, there is no reason then to slim HR1 down. Defending against the Republican strategy in the states requires Layer 1 and Layer 2 at least. Nothing in Manchin’s career suggests he opposes Layer 3. And no one has any principled reason to oppose the icing on this cake — from election security changes to ethics reforms.

To the contrary, Joe Manchin has supported public funding. He has supported transparency reform. And he has spoken again and again against the influence of big money in Washington, and the corruption of, as he puts it, “dialing for dollars.” In short, Joe Manchin has been an anti-corruption reformer from the start. And if Joe Manchin can be brought to see the corruption that the filibuster is now effecting, there is no reason—as Silver, and Hasen and Foley and others have argued—to give up on the other critical anti-corruption bits in H.R.1.

Rather than negotiating against ourselves, what the chatterati should be focused on is making clear just why it is right for Manchin to except democracy reform from the reach of the filibuster. Instead of endless articles in the form “see, here’s why I’m much smarter than Nancy Pelosi or Chuck Schumer or Joe Biden or John Sarbanes,” what would do some real good from these word mongers is clear and principled thinking about why this threat to majoritarianism is so critical — and different enough from other issues to justify a different filibuster rule.

The Democrats have got to come to see that the threat they face is existential. The changes in the Republican state legislatures plus gerrymandering will mean that Republicans will take control of Congress, even if a majority of voters would prefer Democrats. Once they recognize this existential threat, they must then ask a simple question: Are they fighting for the Democratic Party alone? Or the Democratic Party plus democracy. Pass Layer 1 and 2 and you’ve defended the Democratic Party. Pass Layer 3 and you’ve protected democracy.

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