Summary

Ukraine aims to gain a strategic advantage in the war by destroying 250 Russian tanks per month, leveraging their current rate of tank losses and focusing on increasing their destruction rate to impact Russia's offensive and defensive capabilities.

Abstract

The article discusses Ukraine's potential strategy to win the war against Russia by significantly increasing the rate of Russian tank destruction. It highlights the refurbishment of old T-62 tanks by Russia due to a shortage of usable tanks in storage and the vulnerabilities of these tanks. With visual evidence showing Ukraine's success in disabling a substantial number of T-62 tanks, the article suggests that Ukraine could deplete Russia's tank force by December if they manage to destroy 250 tanks each month. This would severely limit Russia's ability to conduct ground offensives and eventually undermine their defensive capabilities. The article acknowledges the challenge of this task but points out that Ukraine has already been destroying an average of 100 tanks per month and could increase this rate by prioritizing tank destruction and employing various tactics, including the use of artillery, drones, and anti-tank weapons like the NLAW.

Opinions

The author believes that Russia's reliance on refurbishing outdated T-62 tanks indicates a significant strain on their military resources.
The article implies that Ukraine's focus on destroying tanks could shift the balance of power on the battlefield, especially if they can sustain or increase the current rate of tank losses.
There is an opinion that Ukraine's ability to manufacture and deploy drones and grenades, as well as the potential for increased support from European countries in the form of anti-tank weapons, could be key factors in achieving the goal of destroying 250 tanks per month.
The author suggests that Russia's self-proclaimed superpower status is contradicted by their apparent struggle to maintain an adequate tank force, hinting at the possibility of Russia running out of tanks during the conflict.
The article conveys that Ukraine's strategic prioritization of targeting Russian tanks could be a decisive factor in the war's outcome, potentially leading to a reduction in Russia's combat effectiveness and an advantage for Ukraine.

How Ukraine Can Win the War on Their Own: Destroying 250 Tanks a Month

A challenge worth a strategic rejig

Ain’t no super power, are you? (Total number of weapon systems lost by Russia since February 2022.)

After inspecting the 103rd Armored Repair Plant in Atamanovka, located in the in far east corner of Russia, Andrei Gurulev, Deputy Governor of Zabaykalsky Krai, said,

“The plant is fully assured with contracts for the next 3 years; [they will be making] 800 tanks during this time — it’s a very large order. The plant works in two shifts, is ready to work in three, and we must help with this”.

The three shifts the deputy governor wanted the plant to run were not for building new tanks for Russia’s three-day special military operation in Ukraine. Instead, they were trying to burn the midnight oil in order to refurbish the antique T-62 tanks, take them out of storage, retrofit them, and send them to Russian troops fighting a forever in Ukraine.

The T-62 was the main battle tank developed by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. It served as a successor to the T-55 and was one of the most widely produced tanks of the era. The T-62 featured significant improvements over its predecessor, including a more powerful 115mm smoothbore gun and increased armor protection. It played a prominent role in various conflicts during the Cold War and beyond.

The Soviet Union stopped building T-62 variants in 1975.

The T-62 tanks have been known to have a vulnerability with their turret design, which can lead to catastrophic consequences if the turret is hit. This vulnerability primarily stems from the placement of ammunition inside the turret. If the ammunition is hit, as is probably the case in the video attached below, it can cause a chain reaction resulting in the explosion of the turret. This issue was identified and addressed in later tank designs, but the T-62’s vulnerability to turret explosions has been noted in various conflicts where it has been deployed.

These are the kinds of tanks Russians are taking out of storage and asking the Russian soldiers to fight with. And people are surprised that the Russian Czar did not come out immediately after ISIS terrorists killed more than a hundred people in Moscow.

Visual evidence collected by open-source analysts at Oryx shows that Ukraine has either captured, destroyed, or damaged 72 T-62 tanks. This should dispel any doubts about whether Russia is retrieving equipment from cold storage to deploy it to the frontline.

Approximately 80% of Russian armored vehicles entering combat service “are not new production but instead are refurbished and modernized from Russian war stocks.”

Russia has lost 2,856 tanks since the beginning of the war. (These losses are visually confirmed, indicating that the actual number of losses may be slightly higher.)
The current Russian tank production capacity (with 80% being refurbished) is around 120 tanks per month.
A senior NATO official told CNN that Russia has 5,000 tanks in storage. Then added, “probably a large percentage of those can’t be refurbished and are only good for cannibalizing parts.”
Let us assume Russia still has 3,000 tanks that it can pull out of storage.

Russia entered this war with around 3,200 tanks on hand. In the first few months of the war, they lost a colossal number of tanks. The decision to reboot the idling factory in far eastern Russia and retrofit decades-old T-62tanks was made as early as October 2022. Old tanks have been flowing into Ukraine for a while now. Therefore, we do not know the exact composition of old, new, refurbished new, and refurbished old tanks in the hands of Russian forces

What we do know is that Russia does not have a lot of usable tanks in storage. Maybe 3,000, probably less. Let us stick to this number: 3,000 units can be brought in at the rate of 120 units per month.

So, what will happen if Ukraine takes out 250 tanks per month from May until December? The number of tanks Russia has on the field will decline by 720 tanks by the end of the year. If they have 2,500 tanks on the field in May, then they will have 1,460 tanks by December.

The positional battle we keep discussing will only occur when both sides are evenly matched in terms of combat power on the battlefield. If the strength provided by the Russian tanks is pushed closer to 50% from its current level, it will have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to wage the war. Initially, they will lose their capability to conduct ground offensives, followed by a loss of defensive capabilities.

Can Ukraine destroy 250 tanks per month?

Difficult, but not an utterly impossible task. Ukraine has taken out an average of 100 tanks per month since the start of the war. Focus can and will aid in increasing the kill rate. When you integrate an idea into your objectives, circumstances tend to align to make it achievable. Solutions emerge as you delve deeper into the pursuit of your goals.

Both Ukraine and Russia utilize tanks as mobile weapons to assist their frontline operations. Sometimes they play a defensive role, and at other times, they play offense. The sheer number of tanks lost by both sides shows the significant role tanks play in their respective strategies. Tanks hold greater importance for the Russians than they do for Ukraine.

The lack of sufficient artillery shells is one factor why Ukraine treats them as highly valuable assets, carefully selecting their targets. If a tank is advancing and there is a Russian air-defense system operating in the frontline, Ukraine would prioritize targeting the air-defense system over the tank.

However, if destroying tanks becomes a top priority, this strategy would need some adjustment. The ideal position for Ukraine would be to not make a choice, but to target both Russian assets.

The key to inflicting unsustainable tank losses on the enemy would be to position oneself to utilize artillery effectively, targeting tanks, facilities where tanks are parked near the frontline, and during their transportation to the frontline.

Ukraine will also utilize first-person drones to drop grenades into tanks to destroy them. Since they manufacture these drones and grenades themselves, they can rely on their own ability to execute this strategy. Another tactic they can employ is deploying infantry armed with tank killer weapons throughout the frontline. These infantry units are already there at the frontline. Ukraine has to ramp up this number significantly.

The NLAW (Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon) developed by Sweden and the United Kingdom is a great hand-held weapon that can be used to target tanks. Europe can send these type weapons in good quantities to Ukraine. Sweden has sent 57 units to Ukraine. The United Kingdom sent more than 4,000 units to Ukraine within weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine. There is enough stock and production capacity to keep these units flowing at a heavy pace to Ukraine.

Ukraine can prioritize the destruction of Russian tanks. While the one million shells Europe ordered for Ukraine are beneficial, it would be even more advantageous if that stockpile continues to grow. President Zelensky would benefit from discussing with the Czech President and ensuring that efforts are made to acquire every available shell.

Russia has a weakness that can be fully exploited to gain the advantage on the battlefield, potentially making them the first self-proclaimed superpower to run out of tanks in the midst of a war.