An Epitome of Pyrrhonism

Don’t Confuse Pyrrhonism With Skepticism

Pyrrhonism is the earliest form of Western philosophical skepticism; however, what we now consider to be skepticism is so greatly different from Pyrrhonism that calling Pyrrhonism “skepticism” produces severe and difficult-to-reverse misconceptions of what Pyrrhonism is. This is exacerbated by presentations of Pyrrhonism that distort it, sometimes with blithe excuses such as this one in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Without any claim to historical accuracy, we will take Pyrrhonian Skepticism to be absolute skepticism — the thesis that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude….”

Pyrrhonism is not absolute skepticism. While suspension of judgment plays a major role in Pyrrhonism, it is not its only justified attitude. The aim of this article is to highlight the aspects of Pyrrhonism that are contrary to this erroneous narrative.

Most contemporary philosophers use the term “skepticism” to refer to refer to the core concern of epistemology: how do we know what we know? The main problem behind this is that “skepticism” has come to be strongly associated with doubt. This is not true of the ancient Greek term from which “skepticism” is derived. That term has nothing to do with doubt. It is about inquiry and investigation. To associate Pyrrhonism with doubt is an error. Our surviving ancient sources on Pyrrhonism do not describe the Pyrrhonist state of mind as doubt. Instead they describe it as suspension of judgment, being at an impasse, or engaged in further inquiry.

Inquiry, investigation, coming to an impasse, and suspension of judgment are the key features of Pyrrhonism. Doubt is not a feature of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism is fundamentally about ethics, not epistemology.

Adding to this is that most of the scholarship on Pyrrhonism focuses on a single feature of Pyrrhonism and a perceived dilemma associated with that feature. One of the major spiritual exercises of Pyrrhonism is suspending judgment on all non-evident claims. Cultivating this ability is a central feature of Pyrrhonist practice. However, some scholars think this feature creates a dilemma: Can a Pyrrhonist say what Pyrrhonism is without contradicting their injunction to suspend judgment?

That may be a problem for the imaginary Pyrrhonists inhabiting the minds of out-of-touch academics, but it is not a problem for actual Pyrrhonists as Pyrrhonism does not entail suspension of judgment about everything.

A closely related misconception of Pyrrhonism is that it has nothing that could be called “doctrines.” This misconception is likely due to translation problems (particularly at Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I Sections 15–17). The Greek term translated into English as “doctrine” is dogma. However, dogma is used in Pyrrhonist texts as a technical term that is explicitly narrower than its common usage. Its technical definition is “firm belief in a proposition about a non-evident matter.” “Non-evident” here means something similar to “non-empirical.” This technical definition is narrower than the English usage of “doctrine.” For example, in English “doctrine” may be used to describe a policy regarding how to deal with issues, such as the Monroe Doctrine. Pyrrhonism has this kind of doctrine. Pyrrhonism is a philosophy of life. It is a doctrine about how to deal with life. The focus of this article is to outline the central features of Pyrrhonist doctrine.

With that background out of the way, here I present the Pyrrhonist stance in summary form. References to the works of Sextus Empiricus are here abbreviated as follows:

· Outlines of Pyrrhonism = OP

· Against the Ethicists = AE

· Against the Astrologers = AA

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Epitome of Pyrrhonism

The Objective of Pyrrhonism

Like the other Hellenistic philosophies of life, the objective of Pyrrhonism is eudaimonia.

The experience of the Pyrrhonists has been that eudaimonia is preceded by a mental state we call “ataraxia” — a state of being mentally unperturbed. It has also been the experience that ataraxia is preceded by a mental state we call “epoché” — a state of mind where we neither affirm nor deny anything non-evident. (OP 1.8–10)

The Barriers to Eudaimonia

The first barrier to eudaimonia is that experience presents us with anomalies. We encounter things that seem to be facts, but they are contradicted by other things that seem to be facts. This is disturbing.

At first it seems that this disturbance can be eliminated by discovering which seeming facts are true and which are false; however, efforts to do so seem to make us worse off than when we began, as these efforts lead to dogmatizing, which is the second barrier. (OP 1.12)

The Problem with Dogmatizing

We use dogma as a technical term, in one of the senses it had in ancient Greek: firm belief in something non-evident. “Evident” in this usage means something close to “empirical.” Another, meaning of the ancient Greek term dogma is “what one agrees to.” We do not use dogma in that sense, because Pyrrhonists do engage in agreement and disagreement about evident matters. (OP 1.13–14)

Hence we can say here what doctrines we follow, as we base these doctrines on experience, and not on things non-evident. We report what is based on our experience, not firmly maintaining anything about what is true beyond the appearances (aka objective reality). (OP 1.15)

What is fundamentally wrong with the dogmatic schools, such as Stoicism, is that they make the attainment of eudaimonia dependent on some ultimate knowledge about reality — knowledge which they cannot be said to have. Because of this, they are attached to things that cannot be proven to be true. Moreover, because the dogmatists are in contradiction with each other, most of them must be wrong.

Worse, their attachment to their dogmas fills the dogmatists with egotism, pride, delusion, and hubris, all of which are impediments to ataraxia and eudaimonia. No amount of spiritual exercises can extricate dogmatists from these ill effects of their dogmatizing on their so-called “philosophy” because dogmatizing does not lead to wisdom. (OP 1.18)

The Pyrrhonist Logos

Since dogmas are unreliable for deciding how to conduct one’s life, they are unfit for use. Instead, we should rely on non-dogmatic methods — methods that are based on what is evident, i.e., directly accessible to human experience.

Hence, all Pyrrhonist doctrines are built on that which is observable, i.e., the appearances. It is dogmatic statements about the non-evident that we say we neither affirm nor deny. We grant the things that stir our senses and feelings and drive us by force to assent. (OP 1.193)

Statements about evident matters we do affirm and deny. For example, we say astrologers promulgate superstition and work to prevent the use of right reason. (AA 2)

The Appearances

The appearances are the phenomena: that which can be observed and experienced. We do not maintain that the appearances represent reality. We do maintain that they are forced upon us and exist in a limited sort of way as facts. We observe that there is usually agreement about how things appear. The disagreements are typically about what is behind the appearances. (OP 1.22)

One concern that Pyrrhonists have about dogmatism is that some dogmas go so far as to tell us that the appearances are deceptive and should not be believed. It seems to us that we should not trust such dogmas. (OP 1.20) We prioritize following the appearances.

The Pyrrhonist System of Philosophy

The Pyrrhonist system is a way of life that uses the Pyrrhonist spiritual exercises to achieve epoché, and bases decisions on the appearances, general conformity with the customs, laws, and institutions of our society, and on our own individual feelings. Our experience with this system is that it allows people to seem to live rightly, not only with respect to virtue, but in the ordinary sense as well. (OP 1.16–17)

Deciding Without Reliance on Dogma

To make decisions in life one needs a criterion. The dogmatists claim that the criterion must be based on what is true and false about reality (i.e., dogmas). In our experience, this is false. We find that decisions can be based on criteria other than dogmas. They can be based on the appearances, our own feelings, our society’s laws and customs, and the use of skills and technical know-how to get things accomplished. None of these things require the use of any dogmas. (OP 1.23–24)

The Main Therapeutic Ingredient of Pyrrhonism

People who believe that something is by nature (i.e., objectively, in reality) good or bad find themselves repeatedly upset. They are upset when they fail to possess things they think are good. They feel tormented when subjected to things they think are bad. When they succeed in getting what they think is good they are prone to immoderate exultation. They are tormented by fears of change, of losing what they think is good and of being subjected to what they think is bad. (OP 1.27)

For the person who is in distress due to their avoidance of evil or pursuit of good, it will only be possible them to escape that distress by making it evident to them that there does not exist anything which is either good or evil by nature, ‘but these things are judged by mind on the part of humans,’ as Timon says. Among the ancient Greek philosophies of life, this teaching is unique to Pyrrhonism; and it therefore is Pyrrhonism’s achievement to secure eudaimonia. (AE 140)

Human Perception Is Not Privileged

We observe that animals perceive things differently from how humans do. In many cases we can see that animals perceive things we cannot. We can therefore infer that human perception is not capable of telling us how things really are. (OP 1.40–78)

Human Perception Varies

Perception among humans differs. Therefore we cannot be sure that the perception of any particular human is capable of telling us how things really are. (OP 1.79–91)

Human Senses Give Different Accounts

Each thing that appears to us in sensation seems to affect us in complex ways. For example, an apple may appear as smooth, fragrant, sweet, and yellow. But it is not evident whether the apple really has these and only these qualities. The qualities may be experienced differently by different people. The apple may have qualities that no one can perceive. (OP 1.91–97)

Aristotle claims (De Anima, III, 2, 425b) that the senses are exactly proportionate to the objects of sense. But what is this “nature”? “Nature” is a subject of controversy. As such we cannot know whether Aristotle’s claim is true. (OP 1.98–99)

The Intellect Is Not Capable of Apprehending External Objects

Since the senses cannot be said to correctly or fully apprehend external objects, the intellect is not capable of doing so either. (OP 1.99)

All Perception is Circumstantial

All acts of perception depend on conditions and circumstances. Because of this we cannot be certain that perceptions accurately grasp external objects. (OP1.100–113)

All Perception is a Function of Position

Everything is perceived from some location and some distance from the thing perceived. Location and distance changes our perception of the thing perceived. Because of this we cannot be certain that perceptions accurately grasp external objects. (OP 1.120–123)

All Things Are Relative

Everything is in relation to something else. Because of this, it is impossible to state how any external object is objectively, absolutely, by its own nature, but only as it appears, in relation to something else. (OP 1.136–140)

Human Motivations

People chose some things and avoid others based on pleasure and displeasure. Pleasure and displeasure come from the senses interacting with the appearances. (OP 1.87)

Humans Differ from Each Other

We see the same things chosen by some and avoided by others; therefore, people are not affected the same way by the same things. (OP 1.87) Because of this, we can only state what external objects appear to be relative to individual people, not what they are by nature. In other words, we have only subjective accounts, not objective ones. (OP 1.87–88)

Nothing Affects Us by Itself, But Always In Combination with Other Things

All perception takes place via some medium. The conditions of that medium affect what we perceive. (OP 1.123–128)

Quantity Affects Perception

How much of something we experience qualitatively changes our experience of it. Like we experience with medicine, everything is dose dependent. (OP 1.129–134)

Frequency Affects Perception

How we react to a perception is a function of its novelty. (OP 1.140–144)

Conventions Vary

Beliefs about all sorts of things, such as cultural practices, laws, customs, religion, and theories, vary widely. For any given belief held by some people there is typically a contrary belief held by others. Because of the anomalies among these things treated as facts by those who believe them we cannot conclude anything about the nature of these “facts”; we can only say how they appear in relation. (OP 1.145–163)